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Martial Lawyers:  
Lawyering and War-Waging in American History 
Bernard J. Hibbitts* 
I. AMERICAN LAWYERS AS WARRIORS: RECOVERING AN 
INCONVENIENT TRUTH 
American lawyers like to celebrate themselves as practitioners of 
peaceful dispute resolution. On public and professional occasions they 
proudly proclaim their loyalty to the rule of law over brute force. Beneath 
their pacifistic rhetoric, however, lurk less placid and more problematic 
realities. Many American lawyers are highly adversarial and even 
combative; in seeking business, they often stress on TV, billboard, and bus 
advertisements that they “fight” for their clients, and more than a few take 
that pugnacious attitude into courtrooms where they conduct notoriously 
uncivil litigation. Prosecuting lawyers representing the American state 
command overwhelming physical power that is routinely applied to law-
breakers, sometimes with intentionally fatal results; speaking of criminal 
law and punishment, Yale law professor Robert Cover was right to observe 
30 years ago that “legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and 
death.”1 
But the relationship of American lawyers with violence runs deeper and 
is potentially even more disturbing than all this because in one fundamental 
                                                                                                     
*  Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A. Dalhousie University; 
M.A. Carleton University; B.A. (Juris.), Oxford University; LL.B. Dalhousie University; 
LL.M. University of Toronto; LL.M. Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Law, 
Peace, and Violence Symposium coordinator Yxta Murray and colleagues in attendance 
at presentations of this paper in Seattle and Morgantown, West Virginia for their 
thoughts, comments, and good suggestions. In Pittsburgh (not to mention Montreal and 
New York!), Megan McKee provided extraordinary research assistance. Without her 
unstintingly generous help and support this article would be much less. 
1 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1616 (1986). See also 
generally LAW’S VIOLENCE  (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).  
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yet conveniently overlooked respect it has been so concrete, so bloody, so 
persistent, and so intensely personal. From the very beginning of 
colonization, lawyers in America have been primary wagers of war. 
Leaving aside for the moment professional soldiers who only began 
proliferating in significant numbers in the late nineteenth century, lawyers 
as an occupational group have been uniquely prominent in American 
history as invaders, battlefield commanders and soldiers, militia leaders, 
armed revolutionaries, filibusters, rebels, paramilitary intelligence agents, 
proponents of militarism, and civilian war managers. American lawyers 
have enthusiastically organized war, led war, and fought war. In this article 
I will substantiate and develop these claims, arguing that war has shaped 
American lawyers both professionally and personally, and that lawyers have 
in turn played a major role in shaping the American way of war.2 
It stands to reason that lawyering and war in America should be 
intimately and perhaps uncomfortably linked. Both have been integral to 
American society. The fundamental role of lawyers in American culture 
from Revolutionary times to the present day need not be reviewed here. 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic nineteenth century characterization of 
lawyers as the putative “American aristocracy”3 is well known. Given their 
involvement over time in multiple areas of American life (from business to 
                                                                                                     
2 While including sufficient historical citations to support the general argument and 
adding some that I believe would add real value to it, I have intentionally declined the 
Bluebook’s invitation to cite virtually every “factual assertion” made in the pages that 
follow. Basic details concerning the historical activities of particular individuals 
mentioned here are well-documented in multiple standard biographical dictionaries and 
databases—e.g. AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://www.anb.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015); the OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxford 
dnb.com/ (last visited Feb 2, 2015)—and I would refer the curious or doubting reader to 
those. In other instances I have assumed that the reader has a rudimentary understanding 
of American history in general, and American legal history in particular, which is 
otherwise beyond the purview of this article to provide.  
3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.V. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1966) (“If you ask me where the American aristocracy is found, I have 
no hesitancy in answering that it is not among the rich, who have no common link uniting 
them. It is at the bar or bench that the American aristocracy is found.”). 
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journalism to education to religion), a case could be made—pace 
Gramsci—that lawyers have been America’s “organic intellectuals,”4 
holding the country together by their very ubiquity as much as by their 
inclination. Similarly, war has been a central element of the American 
experience. The country was seized in war (against Native Americans), 
defined in war (against the British), and preserved in war (against the 
Confederacy). Several commentators have noted that war has been virtually 
continuous in the American record.5 Its prevalence may also be necessary in 
the American environment. Absent a long history or a common ethnic or 
religious core, war may be the ultimate tool of American nation-building,6 
what theologian Stanley Hauerwas has called the “glue that gives 
Americans a common story.”7 Foreign observers—especially those whose 
countries have been subject to (sometimes repeated) American attacks—
have long been struck by the prominence of war in American history,8 
                                                                                                     
4 The term was made famous in ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON 
NOTEBOOKS (Geoffrey N. Smith & Quintin Hoare eds., 1971). 
5 Recently, see generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2012). 
6 Of course, relatively high population, a favorable geographic position between smaller 
and less powerful neighbors, and insulation from competing major powers by vast oceans 
have historically favored this policy choice. 
7 STANLEY HAUERWAS, WAR AND THE AMERICAN DIFFERENCE: THEOLOGICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE AND THE AMERICAN IDENTITY 4 (2011) (“War is a moral 
necessity for America because it provides the experience of the ‘unum’ that makes 
‘pluribus’ possible. War is America’s central liturgical act necessary to renew our sense 
that we are a nation unlike other nations.”). 
8 Canadians such as myself, for instance. This is not surprising given that (1) Canada 
has a significantly less violent (albeit hardly bloodless) political and military past; (2) 
Canada’s original English population was heavily composed of refugees from an 
American war (i.e., the Loyalists); and (3) Canada (or its antecedent British colonies) has 
been the target of attempted American invasions on at least four occasions in the past 250 
years (1775, 1812, 1838, and 1866); prior to that, French colonies in Canada were 
attacked by English colonies in what is now the United States in 1613, 1690, 1710, and 
1745. Working war plans for the US invasion of Canada developed as late as the 1920s 
were only shelved in 1939 at the onset of World War II. War Plan Red, declassified in 
1974, provided for the strategic bombing of my hometown of Halifax, Nova Scotia, and 
the potential use of poison gas against Canadian targets in the context of a projected 
military struggle with the British Empire. For a general—and still the only—
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although most Americans have understandably ignored or underplayed the 
phenomenon.9 Symbolically, if unwittingly, modern Americans bring war 
and lawyers together every time they sing the national anthem: the Star-
Spangled Banner was written by a lawyer watching a battle.10 
In no other common law jurisdiction (not in the United Kingdom, not in 
Canada, not in Australia)—perhaps in no other jurisdiction, period—has the 
linkage between lawyering and war-waging been so massive and so clear.11 
                                                                                                     
comprehensive evaluation of American cultural martiality from the Revolution down to 
the Civil War, see MARCUS CUNLIFFE, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT 
IN AMERICA, 1775–1865 (1968). Cunliffe was a British historian. 
9 See Ira Leonard, Violence Is the American Way, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE 
(Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17195.htm 
(“Americans have little genuine understanding of the major role played by war 
throughout the American experience.”); see also Russell F. Weigley, America as a 
Martial Society, AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air 
chronicles/aureview/1969/may-jun/weigley.html (last visited July 24, 2014) (opining that 
“[f]or an American to emphasize the distinctly military qualities of American society . . . 
would seem either too much of a boast or too much a mea culpa, depending on the point 
of view”). 
10 The lawyer was of course Francis Scott Key, who witnessed the bombardment of 
Baltimore from a British ship he had boarded to negotiate the release of American 
prisoners of war. As Marcus Cunliffe observed,  
The “Star-Spangled Banner” is a good example of [a] formative martial impulse: 
here was a nation fashioned on the battlefield no less than in the council 
chamber—brought into existence through violence, among the thud of guns and 
in the rockets’ red glare. The “Star-Spangled Banner” is both anthem and battle 
cry.  
Cunliffe, supra note 8, at 68. That generations of Americans have enthusiastically 
embraced a lawyer’s “battle cry” as their own says as much about the traditional place of 
lawyers in American culture as it does about the longstanding martial ethos of American 
lawyers themselves.  
11 This is not to say that the linkage has been absent or altogether unnoticed in those 
jurisdictions. On the United Kingdom, see, e.g., Thomas Frost, Fighting Lawyers, in THE 
LAWYER: HISTORY, LITERATURE AND HUMOUR (William Andrews ed., 1896). On 
Canada, see, e.g., The Life of Sir John Beverley Robinson, 41 CANADA L. J. 199 (1905) 
(describing the military service of the future Chief Justice of Upper Canada [Ontario] in 
the War of 1812 while still a law student and noting that “within thirteen years, viz., 
between 1828 and 1846, seven judges were sitting in the Bench all of whom had seen 
fighting in the Revolutionary War, or in that of 1812-15, and two of whom had been 
severely wounded.”) In neither Britain nor Canada, however, did lawyer-soldiers 
dominate military professionals or the general waging of war to the degree they did in the 
United States.  
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And yet, we lawyers have missed it. Perhaps persuaded by our own 
professional propaganda, we have instead become enamored with what I 
call the “JAG myth”—the prevailing notion that the exclusive military role 
of lawyers in American history has been the relatively benign one of 
administering military justice while standing by to advise battlefield 
personnel of their legal rights and responsibilities, as needed. The image is 
neat, tidy, bloodless, and notably self-satisfying in its displacement of 
responsibility for violence onto others. It is also an ahistorical conceit. 
Why have we refused to even entertain an alternative perspective? The 
problem is a combination of self-absorption and self-interest. American 
military historians—more than a few with some measure of military 
background themselves—have largely been concerned with the history of 
professional soldiers and soldiering. Not only have they not been 
particularly interested in lawyers, but they have implicitly considered the 
prominent role of ostensibly unmilitary lawyers in the American military 
past as something of a military embarrassment, to be politely overlooked 
rather than focused on or celebrated. Meanwhile legal historians have paid 
woefully little attention to what lawyers have done in American culture 
outside of practice; the concrete military role of lawyers in particular has 
arguably been so counterintuitive and potentially distasteful to pacifistic 
modern legal scholars with few if any connections to the military that it has 
not even been looked for, let alone looked at. 
The result of our inattention has been a major scholarly blind spot I only 
noticed in developing a course on the history of lawyering that I have taught 
in Pittsburgh for some four years now.12 Preparing the American segment of 
the survey, I was struck by the number of lawyers I encountered who had 
had significant military responsibilities and experiences—some political 
and bureaucratic, but many others personal and grimly concrete. At the end 
                                                                                                     
12 See generally BERNARD J. HIBBITTS, Teaching the History of Lawyering: Who Do We 
Think We Are?, in TEACHING LEGAL HISTORY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Robert 
M. Jarvis ed., 2014). 
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of the day it turned out that American lawyers were by tradition “armed and 
dangerous,” and in that capacity they figured in virtually all American wars 
and many other lesser conflicts. 
Of course in this respect American lawyers are not unique among 
American occupational groups. Due especially to the long-standing 
American military reliance on citizen-soldiers, there have over time been 
thousands of doctors, merchants, farmers, bankers, and others who have 
fought in official and unofficial American campaigns, and whose collective 
contributions to American war-waging are similarly understudied. Certainly 
there have been more farmer-soldiers and merchant-soldiers than lawyer-
soldiers. But in the American experience, lawyer war-wagers have 
nonetheless been different. In comparison with other occupational groups, 
lawyers—as we shall see—have played a disproportionately prominent 
leadership role in war. As personal agents of law in American society, many 
moreover appear to have been drawn to military service and war-waging on 
principle as an extension of their dedication to law and their profession, 
despite what we, from our contemporary perspective, might assume to the 
contrary. Once in military roles, they did not seek or find themselves 
compelled to shed all aspects of their professional identity; indeed, they not 
infrequently leveraged those, affecting military practice and outcomes. Back 
in civilian life, lawyers’ military service in various capacities in turn 
arguably shaped their legal careers, their legal thought, and their 
professional attitudes. The martial role of American lawyers is therefore 
worth independent examination. 
In the remainder of this article, I propose to sketch the basic outlines of 
the occupational relationship I have suggested here. Part II describes the 
changing place and significance of martial lawyers over the course of 
American history, chronicling their initial appearance at colonization, their 
post-Revolutionary rise to social and professional prominence, the 
existential crisis they experienced in the devastating Civil War, and their 
subsequent (albeit gradual) retreat afterwards to other less violent fields of 
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endeavor. Part III offers an initial assessment of the professional and/or 
military implications of martial lawyering, exploring the impact that war-
making had on American lawyers, and how martial lawyers in turn 
influenced American war-waging. 
Much of this argument deserves extended elaboration that cannot be 
offered in the confines of the present piece. I nonetheless hope to whet the 
reader’s appetite for more by starting down some untrodden paths, 
suggesting along the way that the ostensibly incidental (and to our minds 
perhaps idiosyncratic and even peculiar) personal relationships that some of 
us may have been vaguely aware of between a few individual American 
lawyers and war-waging may add up to a connection of much larger 
professional and national significance. 
II. LAWYERS AT WAR: MARTIAL LAWYERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
A. Martial Lawyers at Colonization: Invading the New World 
Lawyering and war-waging arrived in English America together in 1607. 
The first successful colonizing expeditions to Virginia were not led by 
relatively peaceful religious dissenters, like those who later landed in New 
England, but rather by grizzled, battle-scarred soldiers—men like Captain 
Edward Wingfield, Captain Bartholomew Gosnold, Captain Gabriel Archer, 
and the aristocrat George Percy.13 This much is well known, even if it is not 
emphasized in most standard accounts that tend to demilitarize and 
romanticize the Jamestown settlement. What is often forgotten, however, is 
that all the men just named were also old members of the Inns of Court in 
London.14 
                                                                                                     
13 For a recent volume providing general background on the Jamestown expedition and its 
personnel, see KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN, THE JAMESTOWN PROJECT (2009).   
14 For details of their tenures at the various Inns, see the entries for these individuals in 
the OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 2; AMERICAN 
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 2, and other standard biographical dictionaries 
available both online and in print. Archer, the first recorder or secretary of the colony, 
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At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Inns were more than just law 
schools. They were hotbeds of English patriotism, expansionist 
Reformation Protestantism, and entrepreneurial enterprise. In the 
contemporary spirit of humanistic curiosity about the world, they welcomed 
cartographers and explorers into their chambers and capacious dining 
halls.15 In these veritable incubators of empire, English judges, lawyers, law 
students, aristocrats, soldiers, and sea captains collectively planned 
colonies, financed expeditions, and celebrated victories over colonial 
competitors (such as Spain) as well as any other groups that stood in their 
way.16 Some of the young gentlemen who initially went to London to learn 
law for their own personal or family purposes abandoned their legal 
education once they were seduced by soldiering,17 but what they learned 
                                                                                                     
appears to have been the only member of this group who had previously practiced law in 
England. 
15 See generally PETER C. MANCALL, HAKLUYT’S PROMISE: AN ELIZABETHAN’S 
OBSESSION FOR AN ENGLISH AMERICA (2007) (discussing, among other things, the 
network of explorers, geographers, politicians, merchants, soldiers, and lawyers who 
surrounded Richard Hakluyt the elder [Middle Temple] and his nephew, the better known 
travel chronicler of the same name). On the Middle Temple as a particular hub of 
lawyerly interest in exploration, see Richard Hill, The Maritime Connection, in HISTORY 
OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE (Richard O. Havery ed., 2011); R.M. Fisher, William Crashaw 
and the Middle Temple Globes 1605-15, 140 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 105 (1974). 
16 Members of the Inns were prominent in the actual exploration of the New World from 
the very beginning of English efforts, although their initial activities were characterized 
more by failure than success. Lawyer-printer John Rastell (Lincoln’s Inn) personally led 
a colonizing expedition to Newfoundland in 1516; his crew mutinied on the way, 
however, and he was unceremoniously deposited in Ireland. In 1536, Rastell’s son John 
(Middle Temple) was a member of an expedition captained by “Master Hore” that carried  
“many gentlemen of the Innes of court, and of the Chancerie” to the same destination. 
They made land, but were supposedly so starved that some of them resorted to 
cannibalism before they were able to get passage home on a French ship. In addition to 
entries on John Rastell (the younger) and Richard Hore in the DICTIONARY OF 
CANADIAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biographi.ca/en/index.php (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015); see generally the chapter on The Voyage of M. Hore, in RICHARD HAKLUYT [the 
younger], THE PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS, VOYAGES, TRAFFIQUES & DISCOVERIES OF THE 
ENGLISH NATION (2d ed., 1972 [1598–1600]).  
17 The student population of the Inns rose precipitously in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, especially as more gentry families sent their younger sons to law 
as opposed to war. The decline of the post-Armada Spanish threat and a stalemate in the 
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about the world in their time at the Inns nonetheless helped inspire them to 
take the remarkable step of reaching for America. In turn, they never forgot 
their early exposure to legal process, regularly turning to it at times of 
collective crisis.18 Apart from the erstwhile Inns of Court students who 
crossed the ocean, it must also be remembered that a significant number of 
the initial investors in the Virginia Company who made their voyages 
possible were also lawyers—lawyers who had been their teachers, their 
mentors, and their friends.19 The colonization of Virginia was very much a 
lawyers’ enterprise. 
In America, the former law students embraced war out of both ambition 
and necessity. Native American tribes in the area (in particular the 
Pamunkey and other groups in the so-called Powhatan confederacy) 
                                                                                                     
Thirty Years War in the Low Countries, in which many English soldiers fought, probably 
contributed to this trend. There were, however, still martial temptations for ambitious law 
students seeking power, property, and patronage. 
18 For instance, when the leadership of Captain Edward Wingfield was deemed 
unsatisfactory in late 1607, he was formally put on trial by his colleagues and ultimately 
sent back to England. In January 1608, formal charges were similarly brought against 
Captain John Smith (who had no legal education) by George Percy and others, accusing 
Smith of causing the death of two other colonists. Smith only avoided hanging by the 
fortuitous arrival of a supply ship from England, which concentrated the colony’s 
leadership on other matters. Smith later crowed:  
Some no better then they should be, had plotted with the President, the next 
day to haue put him to death by the Leviticall law, for the liues of Robinson 
and Emry, pretending the fault was his that had led them to their ends: but he 
quickly tooke such order with such Lawyers, that he layd them by the heeles 
till he sent some of them prisoners for England.  
JOHN SMITH, THE GENERALL HISTORIE OF VIRGINIA, NEW ENGLAND AND THE SUMMER 
ISLES 49 (1624), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/smith/smith.html (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2014). One wonders whether this is the first recorded expression of anti-
lawyer (or at least anti-legalist) sentiment in the annals of American history. The fact that 
former Inns of Court students and other English gentry all but marooned in a primitive 
palisaded settlement surrounded by a wilderness and threatening natives would choose to 
go to law to settle fundamental internal disputes in dire circumstances within literally 
months of landing suggests how remarkably legalized—and lawyerized—the process of 
American colonization was from the outset. 
19 On the involvement of Inns of Court lawyers (and judges) in backing and organizing 
the early expeditions to “Virginia”, see Hill, supra note 15, at 131–33.  
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understandably viewed the first colonists as invaders,20 and responded 
accordingly. Gabriel Archer (Gray’s Inn) became one of the first recorded 
casualties of the Jamestown expedition when he was wounded in an early 
attempted landing. Edward Wingfield (Lincoln’s Inn) repulsed a later attack 
on the settlement by some 400 warriors. George Percy (Middle Temple) 
eventually took over as commander of the Jamestown fort and led English 
war parties in bloody raids against local Native American villages in 1610.21 
Despite not having any military background himself, newcomer William 
Strachey (Gray’s Inn), the Virginia colony’s secretary between 1610 and 
1611, helped governor Sir Thomas Gates, his successor Thomas West (Lord 
De La Warr), and deputy governor Thomas Dale—all former soldiers 
themselves—frame and issue military-style regulations for the colony. 
These included the infamously harsh “Dale’s Code,” the first American law 
code notably known as “The Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall,” which 
stabilized Jamestown after the so-called “Starving Time” and made it more 
secure against Indian attack.22 In 1622, when the Powhatans almost 
succeeded in wiping out the settlement by massacring some 400 colonists 
on Good Friday, among them Virginia Company stalwart George Thorpe23 
                                                                                                     
20 In these days of greater sympathy for indigenous peoples, it is surprising that only a 
few American historians have explicitly taken this perspective. For one example, see 
FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM AND THE 
CANT OF CONQUEST (1975). 
21 Further details on Archer’s wounding and the military activities of Jamestown’s early 
leaders may be found in any of the standard histories of the colony. A good recent 
starting-point for the curious is FRANK GRIZZARD & D. BOYD SMITH, THE JAMESTOWN 
COLONY: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY (2007).     
22  On Dale’s Code and its impact, see generally DAVID H. FLAHERTY, FOR THE COLONY 
IN VIRGINEA BRITANNIA LAWES DIVINE, MORALL AND MARTIALL, ETC., COMPILED BY 
WILLIAM STRACHEY (1969). 
23 Thorpe himself was distinguished by his unmilitary character and his genuine 
solicitousness towards Native Americans, even as he tried to evangelize them. At first 
disbelieving rumors of a massacre underway, he was killed when he went out to reason, 
unarmed, with the people he called his “children.” Thorpe, George, in THE HISTORY OF 
PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1604–1629 (Andrew Thrush & John P. Ferris 
eds., 2010), available at  http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1604-1629/ 
member/thorpe-george-1575-1622 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
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(Middle Temple—making him the first member of any of the Inns to be 
killed in Virginia), Thorpe’s lawyer friends in England (including 
prominent lawyer-poets Christopher Brooke and John Donne, both of 
Lincoln’s Inn) called for retaliation and continued aggressive colonization.24 
In the decades after initial settlement, the inflow of Inns of Court 
members to Virginia slackened as the leadership of the relatively lawyer-
heavy Virginia Company gave way to royal government.25 Still, legal 
newcomers made their presence felt: another former law student who 
arrived in 1674, Nathaniel Bacon (Gray’s Inn), burned down Jamestown 
itself when the authorities tried to stop him from attacking Native 
Americans who had raided his plantation.26 If anything, the modicum of 
legal training that Bacon and his forbearers possessed seems to have made 
them more rather than less bellicose. Perhaps it was the metropolitan 
English lawyer’s seemingly insatiable appetite for land, profit, and social 
prestige in an increasingly competitive environment that lured legally-
educated gentlemen into combat with those who literally stood in their 
way.27 Or perhaps it was the contemporary legal notion that war against 
indigenous tribes was not really “war” (in the sense of an armed struggle 
                                                                                                     
24 See generally Christopher Brooke, A Poem on the Late Massacre in Virginia, 72 
VIRGINIA MAGAZINE 259 (1964) (reproducing a copy of the Poem published in London 
in 1622). Brooke wrote:  
Take heart, and fill your veynes; the next that bleed 
Shall be those fiends: and for each drop of ours, 
I strongly hope we shall shed theirs in showers. 
25 For more on the transition and the life of one English lawyer caught up in it, see 
THEODORE K. RABB, JACOBEAN GENTLEMAN: SIR EDWIN SANDYS, 1561–1629 (1998). 
26 On Bacon’s Rebellion, see generally JAMES RICE, TALES FROM A REVOLUTION: 
BACON'S REBELLION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICA (2013).  
27 In connection with this question, it is worth observing that seventeenth century 
English lawyer-investors—typical of members of the gentry, as opposed to English 
merchants—seem to have been much more interested in companies primarily proposing 
colonization and settlement (Virginia, Plymouth) rather than trade (East India, Muscovy). 
Far fewer lawyers invested or participated in the latter. See generally THEODORE K. 
RABB, ENTERPRISE AND EMPIRE: MERCHANT AND GENTRY INVESTMENT IN THE 
EXPANSION OF ENGLAND 1575–1630 (1968). 
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against a civilized enemy) at all, a conclusion that may have reduced any 
martial or moral restraint they may have felt. 
B. Martial Lawyers Fight for Their Country: The Revolution Through the 
War of 1812 
By the mid-eighteenth century the initial round of Indian wars on the East 
Coast was largely over, but colonial American lawyers continued their 
martial tradition. Many became leaders of local militia units, not so much 
because they were natural warriors or experienced soldiers, but because 
militia office reflected and helped to secure public status, constituted 
obvious public service, and potentially opened the door to political office. 
Prominent lawyers like James Otis, Sr., in Massachusetts and even the 
ostensibly unmilitary Thomas Jefferson28 in Virginia saw their militia 
service as a welcome duty reflecting not only their willingness to resist 
potential invaders, but also their commitment to keeping public order in an 
otherwise policeless society. Along with their land ownership, their 
personal mastery of arms moreover demonstrated their “public virtue” as 
independent citizens, an aspect of contemporary classical republican 
ideology hearkening back to ancient Roman traditions that scholars have 
described as a “public ethic of martial virtue most suited to war and the 
threat of war.”29 With his classical college education and his legal training 
                                                                                                     
28 As explaind by the National Guard Educational Foundation: 
In 1770, at the age of 27, the Governor of Virginia appointed Thomas Jefferson 
as the county lieutenant, with the rank of colonel, of the Albemarle County 
Militia. Colonel Jefferson was responsible for all militia affairs in the county 
including insuring that the Albermarle County Regiment of Militia drilled on a 
regular basis, that the regimental and company muster rolls were kept up, and 
that militia fines were collected by the sheriff. Jefferson also presided over 
courts-martial and councils of war.  
Jefferson, Thomas, NATIONAL GUARD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, http://www.ngef. 
org/guardmuster/jefferson-thomas/ (last visited January 14, 2015). 
29 William A. Galston, Freedom, Virtue and Social Unity: Gordon Wood’s Classical 
Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 39, 41 (1990). In 
later life, Jefferson notably advised his nephew to prefer the gun to the ball as an object 
of exercise: “while [the gun] gives a moderate exercise to the body, it gives boldness, 
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under polymath George Wythe, Jefferson in particular was doubtless aware 
that in taking on military duties he was following in the footsteps of some 
of the greatest Roman advocates and jurists, including Cicero, Ulpian, and 
Papinian.30 Finally, for Jefferson and other lawyers, militia service was a 
way for individuals often associated with desk work and paper-pushing to 
manifest their masculinity in a rural agriculture-based society that for the 
most part still privileged manual skills and considered professionals such as 
lawyers, clerics, and doctors vaguely effeminate. 
From the 1770s, however, duty demanded direct action as colonial 
consensus fell apart and Patriot fought Loyalist in an American Revolution 
that was very much a civil war. Animated by both personal interest and 
heightened awareness of the legal and political issues underlying the 
conflict, lawyers on both sides took up arms in defense of their chosen 
causes. Some of the new lawyer-soldiers were already famous (like 
Pennsylvanian pamphleteer John Dickinson31 and Virginian orator Patrick 
Henry);32 many were not. Some achieved military distinction;33 some 
                                                                                                     
enterprize [sic] and independance [sic] to the mind.” On the other hand, “[G]ames played 
with the ball and others of that nature are too violent for the body and stamp no character 
on the mind.” THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 405, 407 (J. Boyd ed,, 1950–1982). 
30 As a teenager Cicero fought in the Social Wars prior to the dictatorship of Sulla; as 
governor of Cilicia between 52 and 49 BC, he conducted military operations in his 
province and was accorded the honor of a triumphal procession on his return to Rome. 
Cicero: Military Service, SKIDMORE COLLEGE CLASSICS PROGRAM, http://www.skidmo 
re.edu/classics/cicero/military.html (last visited July 20, 2014). Ulpian and Papinian both 
served as prefects associated with the imperial Praetorian Guard in the third century AD.  
31 Despite having initially opposed independence, Dickinson felt obliged to fight for the 
cause. His efforts, however, were soon frustrated:  
within days after the Declaration of Independence was signed, and despite ill-
health, Dickinson led his battalion on the New Jersey front. He served for only a 
short time; in the face of widespread desertions, which rendered his and other 
battalions useless, and because of his fears for his family as the British 
approached Philadelphia, he resigned his commission to move his family out of 
the city.  
John Dickinson Biography, THE JOHN DICKINSON WRITINGS PROJECT, http://dickinson 
project.rch.uky.edu/biography.php (last visited January 15, 2015).  
32 On Henry’s military career, see Biography of Patrick Henry, RED HILL PATRICK 
HENRY NATIONAL MEMORIAL, PATRICK HENRY VOICE OF THE REVOLUTION, http:// 
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failed.34 Some committed unspeakable cruelties on the battlefield;35 some 
died.36 But military service, especially for young and up-and-coming Patriot 
lawyers and future Founding Fathers like Charles Pinckney and Richard 
Bassett (not to mention law students like Alexander Hamilton and John 
Marshall) unquestionably facilitated later professional and political success 
by publicly proving dedication, leadership, manliness, and virtue. Those 
lawyers who did not serve in military roles were not infrequently seized by 
anxiety and guilt.37 
The victory of the Patriot forces in the Revolution helped push lawyers to 
the forefront of American leadership, largely in the absence of other 
competing elite or would-be elite groups. Members of the hitherto-ruling 
British colonial class and the Anglican clergy, their allies in the established 
church, had been expelled, removed from power, or constitutionally 
neutralized by the new separation of church and state. The new Constitution 
made military men subordinate to civilian control and helped prevent a class 
of purely military leaders from arising. As a result, partly by force of 
                                                                                                     
www.redhill.org/biography.html  (last visited January 15, 2015). 
33 See generally ROBERT K. WRIGHT & MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, SOLDIER-STATESMEN 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
34 John Hancock of Massachusetts fared less well than he would have preferred: 
“Hancock was not a success as a major general of the Massachusetts militia, failing to 
take Newport in his one active campaign, but he tried.” ROGER G. KENNEDY, BURR, 
HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON: A STUDY IN CHARACTER 398 (2000). 
35 Given that most Revolutionary War history has been written by the victors, it is not 
surprising that the two most popularly-notorious lawyer-soldiers from the conflict are 
both Loyalists: Walter Butler, a New Yorker who led a company of rangers, and 
Christian Huck, a former real estate attorney from Pennsylvania. 
36 For example, Francis Nash, a Virginian lawyer who rose to the rank of Brigadier 
General in the Continental Army, was killed at the Battle of Germantown in October 
1777.  
37 John Adams talked at one point of leaving the Continental Congress to enlist but never 
did, perhaps for health reasons. He was also somewhat over-age. He protested at one 
point in a letter to former student William Tudor, who later became Washington’s first 
Judge Advocate, that “Wearing a Uniform . . . is not all.” Adams did, however, end up on 
the Congress’s Board of War and Ordinance, becoming what one biographer termed a 
“de facto Secretary of War.” John E. Ferling, Oh That I Was a Soldier’: John Adams and 
the Anguish of War, 36 AM. Q. 258, 268 (1984). 
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circumstance and partly by their own design in vigorously attacking 
“standing armies,” lawyers in the post-Revolutionary period exercised 
overwhelming dominance of American state offices that directly supervised 
the military. Twelve of the first 16 presidents down to the time of the Civil 
War were lawyers (the other four were notably soldiers). Eighteen of the 27 
Secretaries of War to the Civil War were lawyers. Seventeen of the 24 
Secretaries of the Navy to 1861 were lawyers. 
The achievement of American nationhood proved exceptionally favorable 
to the proliferation and collective ascendancy of martial lawyers in general. 
War had brought lawyers to power and the country into being, and martial 
lawyers had helped make those things happen. Lawyers were rewarded for 
their personal martiality with prestige and high positions.38 Afterwards, a 
significant segment of the American legal community felt an 
understandable urge to fight for the country that they had created, that they 
now led, and that they were nurturing. Military service allowed American 
lawyers to demonstrate both their new cultural leadership and their 
ostensible worthiness for that role while providing them a critical and 
uniquely powerful instrument of social control. It was a convenient device 
for creating status in the face of their anxieties about their new cultural 
position and, perhaps, others’ doubts. It also afforded lawyers a(nother) way 
to consolidate their power by the kind of intense camaraderie that was only 
to be found in drill, discipline, and common combat.39 In this context, the 
Republic’s successes, struggles, and strategies militarized American 
lawyers. Its battles were literally their battles. Its victories would be their 
victories. 
                                                                                                     
38 For instance, five of the six Supreme Court justices appointed in the Adams and 
Jefferson administrations between 1797 and 1809 had prior military experience.  
39 “Individuals became a fraternity of manly citizen-soldiers as they participated in the 
practices of the civic militia.” R. CLAIRE SNYDER, CITIZEN-SOLDIERS AND MANLY 
WARRIORS: MILITARY SERVICE AND GENDER IN THE CIVIC REPUBLIC TRADITION 87 
(1999). 
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The phenomenological distance from post-Revolutionary lawyering to 
active war-waging was only decreased by the predominant nature of 
American legal practice during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Lawyers did most of their work in adversarial public settings that 
imposed high civic expectations on them while encouraging them to 
metaphorically combat their opponents in a never-ending professional 
tournament. As lawyers and litigation increased exponentially in the new 
American states from the 1780s on,40 these settings and the confrontations 
that took place within them became central, norm-setting cultural 
institutions. Courtroom argument became the greatest American spectator 
sport of its time. Lawyers’ rhetoric, an emotionally laden tool designed to 
uplift, inspire, and occasionally inflame the juries lawyers addressed, 
inevitably uplifted, inspired, and occasionally inflamed lawyers themselves. 
Loyalty, virtue, patriotism, and the great deeds of great men were not just 
their oratorical stocks in trade—they were also measures of lawyers’ own 
manliness. Conceptually at least, it was but a small step from battle with an 
opponent in court to battle with an enemy on the field.41 On a mass scale, 
robust and theatric adversarialism primed the militaristic pump of the legal 
community and helped set America on a warlike national course. 
In the early years of the Republic, lawyers marched to war for causes that 
were notably very much their own. Even before the Philadelphia 
Convention, when Shays’ Rebellion brought farmers and small debtors into 
conflict with local authorities in Massachusetts, leading to a spate of court 
closures and even to attacks on lawyers, members of the new state bar 
rushed to arms in what in retrospect was a striking martial demonstration 
                                                                                                     
40 In Massachusetts, for example, the number of lawyers increased from 112 in 1790 to 
200 in 1800 to 492 in 1810. See GERALD W. GEWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1840 14 (1979). 
41 Several scholars have noted how high adversarialism makes lawyering and war-
waging analogous. Thus, William F. May: “[N]o profession, save the military, defines its 
task as adversarially as the legal profession.” WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS: 
THE PUBLIC OBLIGATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL 63 (2001). 
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not only of respect for order, but also of professional self-interest. Notably 
no lawyers stood with the rebels, but long established judges and lawyers 
like Maine’s William Lithgow (a French and Indian War veteran) and 
Boston’s Benjamin Hichborn (a Revolutionary War veteran) took up major 
commands of militia and volunteers and set out to quash the Shaysites. 
Newly minted attorney Harrison Gray Otis (grandnephew of James Otis Sr.) 
raised a regiment of light infantry and took up a captain’s commission, and 
law students Timothy Bigelow and Royall Tyler rushed to arms.42 In 1794, 
the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania was not quite so 
professionally lopsided; one of the leaders of the rebellion—David 
Bradford—was a lawyer, and prominent Pittsburgh lawyer Hugh Henry 
Brackenridge was suspected of rebel sympathies. Eastern lawyers like 
Alexander Hamilton (notably the Secretary of the Treasury who had 
proposed the tax on whiskey that the rebels opposed) were, however, having 
none of it, and the weight of the American legal community as a whole was 
clearly opposed. At his own request Hamilton marched with President 
George Washington’s army of federalized militia, which included older 
lawyer-veterans like General Joseph Bloomfield and Major General 
Frederick Frelinghuysen along with just-called young attorneys like Mahlon 
Dickerson, all from New Jersey. The force effectively overawed the rebels, 
occupying Pittsburgh and four surrounding counties.43 
Rising tensions with the British Empire in the Napoleonic period seized 
the imaginations and martial ambitions of many American lawyers, 
especially those with some measure of military experience. Here was a 
potential opportunity to serve their country again in the highest capacity. 
After the Leopard-Chesapeake naval impressment incident off Norfolk in 
1807, rising Virginia lawyer (and later Supreme Court advocate and US 
                                                                                                     
42 See generally Sidney Kaplan, “Honestus” and the Annihilation of the Lawyers, 48 S. 
ATL. Q. 401, 417–18 (1949) (discussing the military role of various lawyers in 
suppressing Shays’ Rebellion). 
43 See generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER 
EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988). 
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Attorney General) William Wirt, already a major in the state militia, 
suggested to his lawyer friends St. George Tucker and Dabney Carr—both 
veterans themselves—that he raise and lead a volunteer “Legion” (in the 
hands of the classically-smitten Wirt, the Roman allusion was no accident) 
that would support the United States in a war that he predicted “will 
probably give us Canada and Nova Scotia.” The step from lawyer to soldier 
was hardly traumatic. Wirt wrote to Carr:  
In this event, I presume that our profession will be but of little 
importance to us. If so, what will you do yourself? Not sit idly at 
home, I presume. For my part, I am resolved. I shall yield back my 
wife to her father, pro tempore, to which the old gentleman has 
agreed, and I shall march.44 
Although nothing ultimately came of the Leopard-Chesapeake incident 
and Wirt’s proposal of a “Legion” was not popularly embraced, the War of 
1812 that followed five years later only made the practical linkage between 
American lawyering and war-waging more obvious. American lawyers 
from the frontier states (Kentucky and Tennessee in particular) flocked to 
the colors and took up leading positions in militia regiments and the federal 
forces. A lawyer in Philadelphia wrote to an acquaintance in Lancaster PA 
that legal business in the one-time federal capital had almost ceased as 
“many of our bar are volunteering under [fellow lawyer Thomas] 
Cadwalader[,]” who had been charged with forming a local militia 
brigade.45  In Virginia, the now somewhat older and more established Wirt 
initially declined an army commission, but when Richmond came under 
threat from nearby British naval action he enthusiastically raised a corps of 
                                                                                                     
44 1 JOHN P. KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT, ATTORNEY-
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 97–99, 196–206 (1856) (describing Wirt’s prior 
military experience, his martial aspirations for himself and his Legion, and providing the 
full text of the various letters quoted supra.). 
45 Quoted in ALBRECHT KOSCHNIK, “LET A COMMON INTEREST BIND US TOGETHER”: 
ASSOCIATIONS, PARTISANSHIP AND CULTURE IN PHILADELPHIA, 1775–1840 174 (2007). 
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“flying artillery” to assist in defense.46 The war was the political making of 
Kentucky lawyer Richard Mentor Johnson (who went on to be Vice 
President under John Quincy Adams) and Tennessee lawyer Andrew 
Jackson (the one-time Indian fighter who was the “hero of New Orleans”). 
At the same time, the war also demonstrated the limitations of lawyers in a 
command capacity. Lawyer and Revolutionary War veteran William Hull 
was caught by surprise by the British siege of Detroit and surrendered 
without firing a shot. Lawyer generals Peter Porter and Alexander Smyth 
fought a duel (another violent lawyerly diversion of the period that appears 
to have been a symptom of the prevailing martial mentality) over 
disagreements relating to the failed invasion of Canada.47 One dismayed 
historian later wrote: “Unfortunately, both missed.”48 
C. Martial Lawyers and Manifest Destiny: Indian Wars, Filibustering, and 
Mexico 
After gaining the White House in 1829, Andrew Jackson continued his 
personal war against Native Americans. Specifically invoking his 
commander-in-chief powers, he deployed the army to enforce the 
involuntary removal of the Creeks, Choktaws, Seminoles, Chickasaws, and 
finally Cherokees westward along what we refer to today as the Trail of 
Tears.49 In Illinois, other frontier lawyers—among them, a young Abraham 
                                                                                                     
46 Id. at 319. 
47 Porter accused Smyth of cowardice at the Battle of Queenston Heights, fought on the 
Canadian side of the Niagara River in October 1812. The British commander usually 
given credit for ultimately repelling the American invaders in that engagement is General 
Isaac Brock; when he was killed on the field he was succeeded in command by 
Lieutenant Colonel John McDonnell, who attacked the Americans a second time before 
being mortally wounded himself. McDonnell was notably a lawyer—in fact, at the time 
of this death, he was the Attorney General of Upper Canada. See generally ROBERT 
MALCOMSON, A VERY BRILLIANT AFFAIR: THE BATTLE OF QUEENSTON HEIGHTS, 1812 
(2003). 
48 JOHN R. ELTING, AMATEURS, TO ARMS! A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1812 
51 (1991). 
49 A recent work on the general subject is A.J. LANGGUTH, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE 
TRAIL OF TEARS (2010). 
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Lincoln—took up arms against local Indian bands in the so-called Black 
Hawk War of 1832 (Lincoln served and buried casualties, but never saw 
combat himself).50 Jacksonian America was expansionist, and so was its 
legal profession. With many states loosening bar admission rules for 
lawyers, more attorneys entered the professional field than there was full-
time work. By necessity, unemployed or underemployed young lawyers 
looked in other directions for work and wealth. Military service offered the 
prospect of pay, activity, social networking, and even land if things went 
well. At the end of his initial enlistment period in the Black Hawk War, 
Lincoln reenlisted. He later explained to his eventual law partner, “I was out 
of work and there being no danger of more fighting, I could do nothing 
better than enlist again.”51 For his service Lincoln received 160 acres in 
what is now Tama County, Iowa.52 
                                                                                                     
50 On Lincoln’s military service, see Harry E. Pratt, Abraham Lincoln in the Black Hawk 
War, in THE JOHN H. HAUBERG HISTORICAL ESSAYS 18 (O. Fritiof Ander ed., 1954). 
51 WILLIAM HENRY HERNDON & JESSE WILLIAM WEIK, HERNDON’S LINCOLN 73 
(Douglas L. Wilson & Rodney O. Davis eds., 2006). Although Lincoln would later joke 
about his military experience in the Black Hawk War, he maintained a lifelong familiarity 
with weapons, personally testing the latest rifles, carbines, and even an early hand-
cranked “coffee-mill” machine gun on the White House lawn during the Civil War. 
Henry J. Reske, Abraham Lincoln: A Technology Leader of His Time, US NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/history/articles/2009/02/ 
11/abraham-lincoln-a-technology-leader-of-his-time. 
52 See generally The Visit of Abraham Lincoln, 4 ANNALS OF IOWA 3RD SERIES, Apr. 
1899, at 462.  
One day while talking to a friend in a confidential way about their lives in 
Illinois [Lincoln] drew from an inner side pocket an old parchment, wrapped in 
a newspaper, which proved to be an old United States land warrant for one 
hundred and sixty acres of land, issued to Abraham Lincoln, Captain in the 
Black Hawk War. His friend exclaimed chidingly: “Mr. Lincoln, why did you 
not years and years ago enter this in the Danville Land District as your friend 
Judge David Davis did, which was the foundation of his great wealth?” “I 
know you are right about this as a business proposition,” he answered, “but 
Davis always knew how to make money and I never did. I was so poor that I 
was afraid I could not pay the taxes on the land if I got it. So I put it and my 
discharge papers with other little souvenirs in Bob Irvin’s Bank Vault, where it 
has been until Hatch and I a month ago started on our junketing trip through 
Kansas, when I went and got it and put it in my pocket thinking I would like to 
have one hundred and sixty acres of land in free Iowa or Kansas.” He saw his 
reason was not satisfactory and added, with the emotion of the great father that 
he was: “When in after years (and the warrant was almost forgotten) my little 
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 Other unemployed or underemployed lawyers went even further afield in 
an effort to secure a future for themselves while indulging their appetite for 
favored political causes. Many of their activities, unlike Lincoln’s, were 
unsanctioned. They were “filibusters”: in the original non-legislative sense 
of the term, men who engaged in private wars against neighboring states, 
hoping to seize land by force. In the 1830s, opportunities for filibustering 
existed both north and south of the existing United States. Lawyers (or ex-
lawyers) were hardly the only filibustering professionals, but probably 
because of the prospect of land, lawyers seemed particularly drawn to the 
activity, even if their reach generally exceeded their grasp (in part because 
US law prohibited filibustering and American authorities sought to suppress 
it in the interest of international harmony).53 
In the North, the unsuccessful Canadian rebellions of 1837 had 
destabilized the border and sent Canadian rebel leaders who had opposed 
British rule scrambling into the United States. There, American 
sympathizers embraced them and organized local private militias, 
surreptitiously called “Hunters’ Lodges,” to probe into Canadian/British 
territory.54 At their height, the Hunters’ Lodges inducted over 40,000 men.55 
The leaders of the self-styled “Patriot Movement” were notably lawyers 
with larger personal and political ambitions: Akron, Ohio, attorney Lucius 
Bierce was commander-in-chief of the Patriot Army in the Northeast, and 
                                                                                                     
boys Bob and Tad came, a great desire sprang up that I would give the boys 
the warrant, that they would always be reminded that their father was a 
soldier!” 
Id. On the acquisition and eventual disposition of the land, and its current status, see 
Lincoln Land in Iowa, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE, http://www.abrahamlincolnonline. 
org/ lincoln/sites/iowaland.htm (last visited July 20, 2014). 
53 See generally ROBERT E. MAY, MANIFEST DESTINY’S UNDERWORLD: FILIBUSTERING 
IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2004) (discussing filibustering and official American policy 
reactions to the practice). 
54 See generally SHAUN J. MCLAUGHLIN, THE PATRIOT WAR ALONG THE NEW YORK-
CANADA BORDER: RAIDERS AND REBELS (2012) (discussing the Hunters’ Lodges and 
the so-called “Patriot War”). 
55 Id. at 84. 
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Michigan attorney Henry Handy led the Patriot effort in the Northwest. All 
came to naught, however, in the face of opposition to the movement by both 
British troops and American state militia. 
In the South, lawyers were also on the move in search of fees, land, and a 
future. One was Daniel Cloud, a young Kentucky attorney who set out 
southward in 1835. He described his journey with several other itinerant 
lawyers in a remarkably revealing letter: 
The reasons which induced us to travel on, were briefly these: first 
our curiosity was unsatisfied; second, law dockets were not large, 
fees low, and Yankee lawyers numerous. . . . Our reasons for not 
stopping in Missouri were first, we were disappointed in the face 
of the country and the coldness of the climate, but most of all, the 
smallness of the docket. There is less litigation in this state than in 
any other in the union for its population . . . and what is going on 
redounds very little to the emolument of the practitioners. I was 
happy to find such a state of case existing, but while following the 
chase, like other hunters, wish to go where game is plentiful, fat 
and large.56 
Cloud and other migratory lawyers like Sam Houston, Steven Austin, 
Thomas Jefferson Rusk, James Pinckney Henderson, and Felix Huston soon 
arrived in Texas, where they became entangled in confrontations with local 
Mexican authorities as well as resident Native American tribes. Once again 
the lawyers took up arms. Although their professional identity has been 
long forgotten (perhaps conveniently so for the purposes of American myth-
making), six lawyers died at the Alamo in 1836.57 One was the commander 
of the beleaguered garrison, William Travis, who had moved to Texas to 
                                                                                                     
56 Letter from Daniel William Cloud, MY KINDRED.COM: FAMILY HISTORY RESEARCH, 
http://mykindred.com/cloud/TX/histories/Daniel_W_Cloud%20letter.php (lasted visited 
July 20, 2014). 
57 See generally Gretchen Allen & Brad A. Allen, Lawyers and the Alamo, 37 DEC 
HOUS. LAW. 48 (1999) (providing brief biographies of lawyer casualties). On problems 
presented by their modern memorialization, see Scott Huddleston, Lawyers Will Have to 
Be Remembered Elsewhere, EXPRESS-NEWS, June 9, 2010, http://www.mysanantonio.co 
m/news/local_news/article/Lawyers-will-have-to-be-remembered-elsewhere-785139.php. 
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avoid debts incurred when he began a law practice in Alabama that quickly 
failed.58 Another was Daniel Cloud, at 22, the youngest of the American 
defenders killed. For those lawyers who survived the war for Texas 
independence, however, the economic rewards were spectacular. Even apart 
from guaranteed professional prospects in a new country of their own, many 
received enormous tracts of land. Edward Tarrant, another southbound 
lawyer from Tennessee who had fought in the War of 1812, received over 
4,500 acres.59 James Reily, a lawyer from Ohio, received almost 1,300 
acres.60 Such bounties were not extraordinary. 
Back in the United States, lawyers continued to play a dominant role in 
American military policy and war-waging. Following threatened or actual 
slave uprisings in the 1820s and 1830s that alarmed white populations in 
two major southern states, lawyers John T.L. Preston (in Virginia) and 
James Hamilton (in South Carolina) pressed for the establishment of local 
military academies; these would eventually become the famed Virginia 
Military Institute and The Citadel.61 In 1841, Virginia lawyer and 1812 
veteran Winfield Scott was appointed Commanding General of the United 
States Army—the country’s senior military officer. He would hold the post 
for 20 years. In 1844 another lawyer—this time a former militia cavalry 
colonel from Tennessee named James Polk—was elected president and 
began the aggressive pursuit of a westward expansion policy that was soon 
labeled “Manifest Destiny.” One of the first implementations of that was the 
war with Mexico in 1846–1847. 
                                                                                                     
58 WILLIAM C. DAVIS, LONE STAR RISING: THE REVOLUTIONARY BIRTH OF THE TEXAS 
REPUBLIC 80 (2004).  
59 Tarrant, Edward H[enry], in 6 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 2 
(William S. Powell ed., 1996). 
60 Thomas W. Cutrer, Reily, James, THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fre26 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
61 See JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH 1800–1861 149–50 (1956) (on the 
formation of the Virginia Military Institute). Preston eventually joined the VMI faculty as 
a professor of language and literature. See JOHN P. THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF THE 
SOUTH CAROLINA MILITARY ACADEMY 12–19 (Walker, Evans & Cogswell eds., 1893) 
(on the circumstances behind the establishment of The Citadel). 
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Like 1812, the Mexican War was popular with lawyers, especially those 
from the frontier states. Including Winfield Scott, five of the seven 
American major generals taking the field in the conflict were lawyers.62 
Prominent or soon-to-be prominent lawyers like Franklin Pierce, Albert 
Pike, Caleb Cushing, and George Cadwalader took command of individual 
volunteer brigades. The timing of the conflict was again propitious. 
Kentucky lawyer and infantry captain Leander Cox wrote later, “I could not 
see what [sic] I would have done better at home as the business of my 
profession was very trifling, and I had involved myself greatly beyond my 
ability.”63 After a successful campaign that culminated in the taking of 
Mexico City, other lawyers like Missourian Alexander Doniphan assisted in 
the administration of new American territory seized from the Mexicans. All 
campaign veterans benefited from post-war bounties that entitled them to 
160 acres of land or $100 in scrip (i.e. paper credit).64 Polk was obviously 
proud of his army and their accomplishments, and was well aware of the 
contributions of his own professional colleagues. In his 1848 Farewell 
Address to Congress, he noted that “Our citizen soldiers are unlike those 
drawn from the population of any other country. They are composed 
indiscriminately of all professions and pursuits—of farmers, lawyers, 
physicians, merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, and laborers—and this 
not only among the officers, but the private soldiers in the ranks.”65 
The Mexican campaign and its aftermath nonetheless left certain 
American lawyers wanting more. Some, especially from the Deep South, 
feared that slavery was still unduly confined and sought to carve out private 
                                                                                                     
62 The others were William O. Butler, James P. Henderson, Gideon Pillow, and John A. 
Quitman. For a list of American commanders, see RICHARD B. WINDERS, MR. POLK’S 
ARMY: THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THE MEXICAN WAR 37 (1997). 
63 Id. at 71. 
64 Mexican War Veteran Research, DESCENDANTS OF MEXICAN WAR VETERANS, 
http://www.dmwv.org/mwvets/howto.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
65 James K. Polk, Fourth Annual Message, December 5, 1948, in THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29489 (last visited 
January 15, 2015). 
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Latin American empires for themselves. Of these lawyers—generally ones 
who had failed to make much headway in the profession—William Walker 
was the most infamous. The quintessential “filibuster,” he actually 
succeeded in invading Nicaragua with a small force and taking over its 
government for a brief period in 1856.66 He was not alone, however—other 
notorious lawyer filibusters of the time included John Quitman, Chatham 
Wheat, and Parker French.67 Ironically, they all embraced a willingness to 
take law into their own hands in an effort to achieve personal success. 
D. Martial Lawyers Turn on Each Other: The Civil War 
What might be called the “lawyerization” of American war reached its 
historical height only a few years later when the North and South came to 
blows in the bloodiest conflict the United States has ever known. Although 
virtually never described as such, the Civil War was a lawyers’ war. It was 
fought over interpretation of the Constitution, a legal document largely 
framed by lawyers, long touted by lawyers as the cornerstone of both the 
Republic and the American legal profession, and supposedly saved by 
lawyers in the famous (or infamous) Compromise of 1850. Now, with the 
Constitution and their country (not to mention their professional pride and 
self-respect) in danger, lawyers on both sides enthusiastically marched to 
war. They fought for what they believed in,68 but they also fought to redeem 
themselves. 
                                                                                                     
66 After his overthrow by an army of Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans in 1857, 
he returned to the United States just long enough to write an account of his expedition 
and raise money and support for a new campaign. That effort was less successful—
captured in Honduras, Walker was shot by a firing squad in 1860. See generally 
LAURENCE GREENE, THE FILIBUSTER: THE CAREER OF WILLIAM WALKER (1937). 
67 See MAY, supra note 53. 
68 Speaking at the dedication of a new law building at the University of Michigan in 
October 1863, Thomas Cooley noted:  
The battle which our brothers are waging in Virginia, and Tennessee, and 
Arkansas, is one of constitutional law. The question at issue is one proper for the 
determination of courts, but it has been forcibly wrested from their control, and 
made the gage of bloody contest. Lawyers engaged in this strife are merely 
settling a point of national law.  
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Lawyers came into this conflict by the thousands. Although there is no 
specific record of Civil War lawyer enlistments, surviving Union statistics 
indicate that pre-war “professionals” made up roughly three percent of an 
army total of over 2,600,000;69 even if only 25 percent of the 
“professionals” were lawyers—likely a low estimate—that would still make 
20,000 lawyers under arms on the Union side alone, more lawyers than 
appear to have enlisted in the entire US Army in World War II,70 when the 
United States had over 12,000,000 men and women under arms.71 A number 
of states lost the majority of their bars to recruitment—in Tennessee, for 
example, somewhere between 60 and 85 percent of the legal community 
joined up,72 a significant number being veterans of the Mexican War. The 
war impacted all segments of the American legal community—elite law 
school graduates as well as more “ordinary” men who had read law in 
offices, judges as well as practicing attorneys.73 Some 326 Harvard Law 
                                                                                                     
ADDRESS BY HON. THOMAS M. COOLEY AND POEM BY D. BETHUNE DUFFIELD, ESQ. ON 
THE DEDICATION OF THE LAW LECTURE HALL OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 15 (1863). 
Other lawyers making the connection between lawyering and war-waging referred to the 
Civil War as a “trial by battle.” See generally Cynthia Nicoletti, The American Civil War 
as a Trial by Battle, 28 LAW AND HISTORY REVIEW 71 (2010). 
69 Civil War Facts, NATIONAL PARKS SERVICES, http://www.nps.gov/civilwar/facts.htm 
(last visited July 20, 2014). 
70 Kenneth C. Royall, Lawyers in War: They Serve in the Pentagon and the Front, 37 
A.B.A. J. 505, 506 (1951). 
71 By the Numbers: The US Military, NATIONAL WORLD WAR II MUSEUM, NEW 
ORLEANS, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-hist 
ory/ww2-by-the-numbers/us-military.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
72 Sam Elliot, Tennessee’s Confederate Courts, TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 2, 
2012), http://www.tba.org/journal/tennessee-s-confederate-courts. By the same token, 
some lawyers did their best to avoid service altogether, even in the face of conscription. 
Prominent (and wealthy) New York lawyer George Templeton Strong paid a 20-year-old 
“Dutch boy” a sum of $1,100 to take his place. Michael T. Meier, Civil War Draft 
Records: Exemptions and Enrollments 26 PROLOGUE: QUARTERLY OF THE NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (1994), http://www.archives.gov/publicatio 
ns/prologue/1994/winter/civil-war-draft-records.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).  
73 Walt Whitman incidentally noted the influx of lawyers in Drum-Taps, which 
dramatized patriotic fervor in New York after the fall of Fort Sumter: 
To the drum-taps prompt, 
The young men falling in and arming; 
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School alumni fought for the Union. Perhaps more surprising (until one 
accounts for Justice Joseph Story’s Southern recruiting efforts in his tenure 
as Harvard’s Dane Professor of Law between 1829 and 1843), at least 223 
fought for the Confederacy.74 
Some lawyers rose through the ranks, but more started at the top. Their 
civilian records as community stalwarts and their ability to speak in public 
and persuade other men to act made lawyers natural military leaders in the 
absence of a large professional officer corps. Of the 425 generals in the 
Confederate States Army, 129 were lawyers, giving members of the bar 
numerical precedence over all other occupational groups.75 On the federal 
side, 126 of the 583 Union generals were lawyers.76 Lawyers also 
                                                                                                     
The mechanics arming… 
The lawyer leaving his office - the judge leaving court; 
The driver deserting his wagon in the street, jumping down, throwing the reins 
abruptly 
down on the horses’ back; 
The salesman leaving the store - the boss, book-keeper, porter, all leaving. .  
WALT WHITMAN, Drum-Taps, in LEAVES OF GRASS (David McKay ed., 1900). 
74 Daniel Coquillette & Bruce A. Kimball, The Republic of Merit: Harvard Law School, 
the First Century (1817-1910) 6–7 (The Bicentennial History of Harvard Law School, 
Vol. I; early draft). The large number of lawyers in the ranks was still celebrated decades 
afterwards by leading members of the bar who remembered the Civil War years. Thus, 
New York railway lawyer Chauncey Depew, looking back while addressing the New 
York State Bar Association in 1896: “The lawyers did their best to bring about a peaceful 
settlement between the North and the South, but when the armed struggle came, they 
enlisted for the war in proportion to their number, in far greater ratio than any other 
profession, calling or vocation.” Chauncey M. Depew, Patriotism and Jingoism-The 
Lawyer’s Duty, 4 AM. LAW. 106, 107 (1986).  
75  EZRA J. WARNER, GENERALS IN GRAY: LIVES OF THE CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS 
xxi (1959). Next were professional soldiers, numbering 125. 
76 EZRA J. WARNER, GENERALS IN BLUE: LIVES OF THE UNION COMMANDERS xix 
(1964). Union lawyer-generals were only outnumbered by generals who had been 
professional soldiers, of which there were 194. Businessmen followed at 116 and farmers 
at 23. One Union lawyer-general, prominent German-American attorney and Lincoln 
loyalist Carl Schurz, notoriously went in a single day from civilian status to being a 
division commander in charge of about 6,000 men. The editors of the New York Herald, 
doubtless along with others, were wary of such instant lawyer promotions:  
We could mention the names of several lawyers in New York who know as 
little of fighting as they do of shoemaking, who have been presumptuous 
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dominated the wartime governments of both sides that managed (or 
mismanaged) the conflict. In the South, 16 of the 18 initial cabinet 
secretaries were lawyers. In the North, all the members of lawyer-president 
Abraham Lincoln’s wartime cabinet except two were also lawyers.77 
On the field of battle, lawyers were involved from the outset of 
hostilities,78 but despite (or perhaps in some instances because of) their 
martial enthusiasm, their record was mixed.79 Henry Halleck, the California 
lawyer derisively nicknamed “Old Brains” who was Commanding General 
of the US Army between 1862 and 1864 (and the lawyer that Winfield Scott 
wanted to succeed him, although the distinction went briefly to non-lawyer 
George McClellan), was bureaucratically capable and can be credited for 
                                                                                                     
enough to put themselves forward for positions, only second to that to General 
Scott himself, and who confidently believe they will receive such appointment.  
Something Wrong in High Quarters, NEW YORK HERALD, June 15, 1861. 
77 See generally Sigurd Anderson, Lawyers in the Civil War, 48 A.B.A. J. 457 (1962). 
The exceptions were Simon Cameron, who served as Secretary of War in 1861–1862, 
and Gideon Welles, a newspaper publisher who was Secretary of the Navy. 
78 The first Union casualty of the war was actually a law student who had clerked with 
Abraham Lincoln in Illinois. Colonel Elmer Ellsworth was killed in a confrontation with 
a secessionist in Alexandria, Virginia on May 24, 1861. President Lincoln was personally 
devastated by Ellsworth’s death; in a macabre foretelling of his own eventual fate, 
Lincoln arranged to have Ellsworth’s body lie in state in the East Room of the White 
House. See Ellsworth, Elmer, in JOHN HOWARD BROWN, LAMB’S BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE UNITED STATES 643 (1901).  
79 Some decided early on in their putative military careers that discretion was the better 
part of valor. In his memoirs, William Tecumseh Sherman told the story of his early 
encounter with a lawyer-turned-captain who declared after First Bull Run that he wanted 
to go back to lawyering again since his 90-day enlistment period was up. Sherman 
threatened to shoot him. The lawyer complained to President Lincoln, then visiting the 
Union encampment, but Lincoln cleverly demurred. Sherman recalled the exchange, 
initiated by the lawyer:  
“Mr. President, I have a cause of grievance. This morning I went to speak to 
Colonel Sherman, and he threatened to shoot me.’ Mr. Lincoln, who was still 
standing, said, “Threatened to shoot you?” “Yes, sir, he threatened to shoot 
me.” Mr. Lincoln looked up at him, then at me, and stooping his tall, spare 
form toward the officer, said to him in a loud stage-whisper, easily heard from 
some yards around: “Well, if I were you, and he threatened to shoot, I would 
not trust him, for I believe he would do it.”  
WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W.T. SHERMAN 176, 206–08 (2000) 
(1875). 
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encouraging both the creation and implementation of the innovative Lieber 
Code on the law of war.80 Halleck was militarily indecisive, however, and 
was eventually replaced in the field by Ulysses S. Grant, a non-lawyer. On 
the Confederate side, legal skill similarly exceeded military prowess on 
more than a few occasions. In 1864, Confederate general A.P. Hill famously 
complained to his commander, fellow West Pointer Robert E. Lee, that 
General Ambrose Wright had bungled a maneuver and cost the army 
unnecessary losses; Hill wanted Wright court-martialed. Lee was more 
sanguine, and reportedly told Hill: 
These men are not an army, they are citizens defending their 
country. General Wright is not a soldier; he’s a lawyer. I cannot do 
many things that I could do with a trained army. . . . You 
understand all this, but if you humiliated General Wright, the 
people of Georgia would not understand. Besides, whom could you 
put in his place?81 
At the same time, some lawyers succeeded brilliantly in field commands. 
On the Union side, boyish-looking Francis Barlow, who had graduated first 
in his class at Harvard Law School, gave up his legal work for the New York 
Tribune newspaper to enlist as a private. By the end of the war he was one 
of the most able and famous generals in the Army of the Potomac. Lawyer 
Lew Wallace, who had gained military experience in the Mexican War, 
enjoyed several military successes and a mercurial rise through the ranks 
                                                                                                     
80 See JOHN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(2012), passim. 
81 WILLIAM WOODS HASSLER, A.P. HILL: LEE’S FORGOTTEN GENERAL 203 (1995). It 
should be noted that, returning the favor, a number of lawyers in the course of the war 
openly disparaged the military skills of professional soldiers. In Congress, Lincoln 
stalwart and fellow lawyer Owen Lovejoy opined at one point that “men who have 
received a military education are more in the way of the success of our arms than 
anything else.” 2 AMERICAN ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA AND REGISTER OF IMPORTANT 
EVENTS 305 (1862). Despite lawyerly reverses in the field, a writer in an 1864 issue of 
the Atlantic Monthly persisted in suggesting that the average lawyer (or businessman), 
could “give the average army officer all the advantage of his special training, at the start, 
and yet beat him at his own trade in a year.” Quoted in BILL HYDE, THE UNION 
GENERALS SPEAK 14–15 (2003). 
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before his reputation was perhaps undeservedly ruined at Shiloh (after the 
war, he went on to write the best-selling novel Ben-Hur). New York lawyer 
(and future Navy Secretary) Benjamin Tracy led his 109th New York 
regiment with such gallantry in the Wilderness Campaign that he was later 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. For the South, lawyers like the 
frustratingly nimble infantry commander Jubal Early, cavalry commander 
John Moseby (the “Gray Ghost”), and naval commander Raphael Semmes 
(captain of the notorious raider CSS Alabama) were all militarily 
distinguished. 
The Civil War, however, was more than just another war in which 
American lawyers fought, or even just one in which more American 
lawyers fought. Perhaps ironically, it was a major portent of decline for 
martial lawyers as a group. Despite appearances, the war was not a lawyers’ 
triumph but rather a lawyers’ failure—a failure of catastrophic proportion 
that revealed not lawyers’ collective strength as defenders of the Republic 
but rather their weakness, and arguably their ultimate unsuitability and 
unfitness for that self-appointed role.82 For all lawyers’ hopes of 
constitutional redemption on the battlefield, the conflict was—among other 
things—the tragic by-product of an adversarial legal culture at the center of 
American life that had ultimately turned on itself in a national and 
professional Gotterdammerung. In a sense, American lawyers had argued 
themselves to death. Between 1861 and 1865, the legal community wore 
itself out rhetorically, physically, and psychologically, only to face 
symbolic disaster in the unprecedented assassination of perhaps its greatest 
                                                                                                     
82 Walt Whitman recognized and subtly mocked the faith that had been placed in the 
bar—and the faith that the bar had placed in itself—as guardians of the Union and its 
integrity: 
Were you looking to be held together by lawyers? 
Or by an agreement on a paper? or by arms? 
Nay, nor the world, nor any living thing, will so cohere. 
Walt Whitman, States!, in LEAVES OF GRASS, supra note 73.  
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national leader, Abraham Lincoln. It would never recover; after the war, 
disheartened, disillusioned, and increasingly distrusted, lawyers turned 
inward to focus on their own professional concerns, institutions, and 
careers, effectively surrendering the positions of political, social, and 
military dominance in American society they had formerly enjoyed. Some 
(notably not deemed “the best men” by their more professionalized 
colleagues) would cling to leadership—or at least the trappings of 
leadership—until roughly the turn of the century, but after the Civil War 
lawyers’ days as the “American aristocracy” were numbered. 
E. Martial Lawyers Retreat: National Guard Service, World War I, and 
 World War II 
In this environment, martial lawyers began a somewhat chastened retreat 
from the battlefield, gradually letting and even encouraging members of 
other American elites to take their place as American lawyers as a whole 
took stock of their new circumstances and reached towards new and perhaps 
more limited professional and personal goals. Their military competence 
had been called into question and their future purpose was unclear.83 
Already there were signs that modern warfare was too large-scale, too 
complex, and too demanding for lawyers’ skill set. It may also have been 
simply too awful. Previous American wars had notably cost far fewer lives84 
                                                                                                     
83 In the North, after lawyers (supposedly) helped save the Union, military service for 
many may have become anticlimactic. In the South, with slavery ended by emancipation, 
martial lawyering arguably became less necessary as an in terrorem mechanism of social 
control. For a time it also became impossible as local state militias were eliminated in 
favor of direct federal military occupation of the Southern states during Reconstruction. 
84 Although official and unofficial estimates vary wildly in the absence of carefully 
amassed or preserved statistics, approximate American military deaths in the Revolution 
were 4,400; in the War of 1812, 2,200; and in the Mexican War, 13,000. Fact Sheet: 
America’s Wars, US DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/ 
factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf  (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). In the Civil War the total 
number of Union and Confederate deaths was a staggering 750,000, over 2 percent of the 
total US population in 1861. Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, 
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-war-toll-
up-by-20-percent-in-new-estimate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. To put Civil War 
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and destroyed much less property, and many lawyers writing in battlefield 
journals in this period reacted to the carnage with horror and revulsion.85 
Between Fort Sumter and Appomattox, the kind of “limited war” that moral 
lawyers and gentlemen might properly and feasibly have engaged in had 
become society-destroying “total war” better left in the hands of military 
experts.86 In the aftermath of the Civil War it was therefore not surprising 
that the US military took a distinct turn in the direction of 
professionalization,87 ironically prompted by a not-so-good lawyer who 
turned out to be a much better general, William Tecumseh Sherman.88 
Sherman encouraged military theorists like West Point commandant Emory 
Upton to draw up plans to put the US military on an entirely professional 
footing and bring it up to the level of European armies.89 
In the meantime, American lawyers’ professional circumstances were 
changing in a way that would make the realization of Sherman’s ambitions 
                                                                                                     
mortality figures in perspective for the contemporary reader, this would be equivalent to 
over 6,000,000 military war dead out of the current US population base. World War II, 
the bloodiest US conflict of the twentieth century, caused slightly more than 400,000 US 
military deaths. 
85 The carnage, of course, extended to lawyers themselves. Although there are no Civil 
War casualty lists for lawyers as a group, some institutional records are grimly 
suggestive. Of the 543 Harvard Law School alumni who marched to war, over 100 died, 
an over 18 percent mortality rate. Coquillette & Kimball, supra note 74. 
86 See generally HARRY STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION: A MORAL HISTORY 
OF THE CIVIL WAR (2006). 
87 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY 
AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957) (see especially chapter 9, The 
Creation of the American Military Profession).  
88  Sherman’s brief legal career is described in ROBERT O’CONNELL, FIERCE PATRIOT: 
THE TANGLED LIVES OF WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN 297 (2014): “He appeared in 
court exactly twice and lost both times—in the latter instance buried beneath an 
avalanche of precedents by his opponent.” Having no formal legal education or training, 
Sherman had been admitted to the Leavenworth County Kansas bar “on the grounds of 
general intelligence.” An 1858 letter from a friend in California informed him that on 
hearing news of his call, “[fellow lawyer and future superior officer Henry] Halleck and 
myself had a good laugh . . . ”      
89 See generally Mark Grandstaff, Preserving the “Habits and Usages of War”: William 
Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform, and the US Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, 
Revisited, 62 J. MIL. HIST. 521 (1998). 
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easier. As corporations grew and the American economy surged in the late 
nineteenth century—what came to be called the Gilded Age—more and 
more lawyers found themselves drawn into practice on a full-time basis, and 
more lawyers found themselves making more money from corporate fees, 
giving them prosperity and security that they were less willing to give up 
for military opportunity or fame. The nature of their work was also 
changing—instead of being mostly adversarial, rooted in rhetoric and 
argument, it was increasingly analytic, designed to facilitate transactions. 
Office lawyers were significantly less attuned to the siren song of combat; 
they were removed from even metaphorical battle to a much larger degree 
than their courtroom predecessors. 
In all these contexts, the lure of commerce proved greater than the lure of 
glory, and military service became fundamentally less attractive to many 
lawyers. This was all the more true as the material rewards for the lawyers 
who had fought in the Civil War, or who proposed to fight afterwards, had 
grown noticeably more abstract. No longer were veterans awarded large 
tracts of land with which to make their fortunes. The frontier was closing,90 
and land was far too scarce and valuable to be parceled out to the 2,000,000 
men who made up the victorious Grand Army of the Republic. There were 
certainly medals and pensions to be had,91 but the value of these paled 
against the loss of income that many lawyers had suffered in four years of 
war. In this context of diminishing returns, the old-fashioned republican 
concept of the citizen-soldier had fewer and fewer material attractions for 
most lawyers; gradually, like the Cheshire Cat, the concept faded from their 
                                                                                                     
90 The superintendent of the US Census opined in 1890 that “there can hardly be said to 
be a frontier line.” Gerald D. Nash, The Census of 1890 and the Closing of the Frontier, 
71 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 98, 98 (1980). 
91 On Civil War pensions as the historical foundation of the American social welfare 
system, see generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE 
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN UNITED STATES (2009). 
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view,92 leaving little but a vague nostalgia for simpler, perhaps more 
patriotic times.93 
From the 1870s, lawyers with surviving pretensions to military roles 
found themselves increasingly isolated in the residual state militias that in 
1903 would formally become the National Guard (although the name was 
                                                                                                     
92 One group that may not altogether have lost sight of the earlier ideology was African-
American lawyers, who during the late 1800s still seemed drawn to military service under 
the citizen-soldier model because it helped them vivify their newfound status as full-
fledged American citizens. See generally BRUCE A. GLASRUD, BROTHERS TO THE 
BUFFALO SOLDIERS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MILITIA AND 
VOLUNTEERS, 1865–1917 (2011). John L. Waller, an African-American lawyer in 
Kansas, was a prominent African-American militia leader who later fought in the Spanish 
American War. See ROGER D. CUNNINGHAM, THE BLACK CITIZEN-SOLDIERS OF 
KANSAS 1864–1901 (2008), passim. Post-Civil War military service may also have 
provided a measure of supplementary employment for underemployed African-American 
lawyers who were victims of direct and indirect discrimination without and within their 
own racial communities, somewhat analogous to how military service had provided an 
economic cushion for underemployed white lawyers in the antebellum era. My thanks to 
Megan McKee for this intriguing suggestion. 
93 As a group, however, lawyers after the Civil War did show a somewhat perverse 
rhetorical fascination with their masculinity, as if that were somehow in question more 
than it had been previously. One wonders in passing if the demilitarization of the 
profession in the late nineteenth century precipitated something of an identity crisis for 
increasingly non-combatant lawyers, leading to “manly” compensations in professional 
posturing and even pedagogy. On the latter possibility, Michael Grossberg has noted 
James Barr Ames’s striking insistence on the “virility” of the post-1870 Harvard Law 
School case method, observing that “[i]n the postwar bar, even the classroom had to be 
made into a battlefield.” Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a 
Masculine Profession, in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD 133, 144 (Mark C. Caines & Clyde 
Griffen eds., 1990). Under these conditions, American legal language took a somewhat 
more warlike turn, with metaphorical references to lawyering as combat rising in the late 
nineteenth century, even as lawyers’ personal connection with war weakened. Martial 
metaphors in medical language multiplied around the same time. See Dale Krieger, Why 
Metaphor Matters, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE, Feb. 1998, http://pages.jh.edu/~jhumag/ 
0298web/metaphor.html  (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). It is noteworthy that legal war 
metaphors prior to the Civil War are relatively difficult to find, suggesting that perhaps 
lawyers who personally knew something about war had little inclination to evoke it in 
their professional speech. A pre-Civil War exception that arguably proves the rule came 
from the pen of Justice Joseph Story, who famously likened lawyers to “sentinels upon 
the outposts of the constitution.” Unlike his idol John Marshall, Story had no personal 
military experience. Progress of Jurisprudence, in 3 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF 
JOSEPH STORY 228 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
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used earlier for militias in a variety of northern states). The Guard itself 
meanwhile became more culturally and professionally divisive as it was 
increasingly leveraged by state and national governments sympathetic to 
capital to discipline and control increasingly violent and desperate 
workers.94 The incipient alliance drew in some lawyers who, perhaps 
because of their corporate clients, were more sympathetic to corporate 
leaders and more fearful of public unrest.95 The lawyers associated with the 
flagship Seventh New York Militia Regiment (also derisively known as the 
“Silk Stocking” Regiment in reference to the social pedigree of many of its 
members), whose privately-funded Park Avenue Armory was more like an 
ornate New York gentleman’s club than a military facility, were a collective 
case in point.96 The same phenomenon arguably repulsed other lawyers 
more sympathetic to labor from the Guard in particular and military service 
in general. 
Inside the Guard, however, individual lawyers pressed their various 
military or militarist causes. In the North, Brooklyn attorney and Civil War 
veteran General George Wingate saw arms and military training as a 
                                                                                                     
94 See generally JERRY M. COOPER, THE ARMY AND CIVIL DISORDER: FEDERAL 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES, 1877–1900 (1980);  JOAN M. JENSEN, 
ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775–1980 (1991). 
95 Speaking to the graduating class at the University of Michigan Law School in 1867, D. 
Bethune Duffield had articulated the social and martial responsibility of lawyers in the 
face of disorder in these terms:  
[W]hen any special and extraordinary excitement stirs the popular mind, like the 
School or Sunday law, or the Labor question, or any other topic springing out of 
the ever-changing character of our politics, over which the community has 
become roused, and riot and pillage threaten, like evil spirits, to break forth with 
flaming brand upon the city, then it is it that the high-minded and loyal Lawyer 
will cast himself into the breach. . . . It is to him, before all others, that the 
masses of the Citizens look for defence in such hours of peril; for he knows the 
Law, and how quickest and best to avail himself of its securities to the public. 
They do not; and so all eyes are turned to him as a kind of civic, and if needs be, 
military leader in a combat with the mob.  
D. BETHUNE DUFFIELD, THE LAWYER’S OATH: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
CLASS OF 1867 OF THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 20 (1867).     
96 On the Park Avenue Armory, see ROBERT L. FOGELSON, AMERICA’S ARMORIES: 
ARCHITECTURE, SOCIETY AND PUBLIC ORDER 1–3 (1989). 
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positive and perhaps necessary form of social control and personal 
discipline in an unstable era, and began to espouse a program of rifle 
practice in the New York schools. Ultimately he helped to organize a 
separate association to support these goals; he became its first secretary, and 
then for 25 years, its president. Today we know it as the NRA—the 
National Rifle Association.97 
In the South, fellow Civil War veteran, state militia commander and 
railway lawyer Thomas Goode Jones was concerned about ethical and 
disciplinary standards in his local Alabama Bar. Traditional norms and 
mores were, he feared, no longer being enforced, and the legal profession 
was suffering as a result. Coming from a military environment that prized 
discipline but perhaps fearing that the disintegration of the martial ethos in 
the post-war South would make enforcement of legal standards through 
traditional community channels (including military service) problematic,98 
he came up with a draft of the first state bar ethics code99 written in vaguely 
militaristic language (“judicial officers,” irresponsibility of “attacks” on 
                                                                                                     
97 On Wingate and the foundations of the NRA, see AMERICANS AND THEIR GUNS, 30–
35 (James E. Serven ed., 1967). 
98 Jones wrote later:  
It was to be expected that the demoralization resulting from the war, would make 
itself felt in the legal profession as it did in all other institutions of our land, and 
while the Alabama Bar for honesty, ability and talent, equals that of any State in 
the Union, it has not yet returned to that state of purity, which distinguished it 
before the war. 
THOMAS G. JONES ET AL., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 7 (1883). 
99 See generally Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of 
the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471 (1998) (describing the drafting 
and implementation of this code). 
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other lawyers, concern for the “defenseless,” etc.),100 which he offered as a 
new way of preserving the honor and standing of the profession.101 
Notwithstanding Wingate’s proposals and Jones’s rhetoric, the American 
bar was “civilianizing.” A measure of how much lawyers’ attitudes toward 
war-waging could change in the course of 30 years was evident right at the 
end of the century when, in the wake of the Spanish American War, 
President William McKinley (a Civil War veteran who became a lawyer 
after war’s end) asked the leading “corporation lawyer” of his day, Elihu 
Root, to join his cabinet as Secretary of War. Of course many lawyers 
before Root had accepted that portfolio without much thought; Root, 
however, had no personal experience of the military and considered being 
bureaucratically in charge of it an unusual assignment for someone who 
considered himself a transactional specialist. Afterwards he described his 
exchange with McKinley as intermediated by the latest wonder of the age, 
the telephone: 
I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking for 
President McKinley: “The President directs me to say to you that 
he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.” I 
answered, “Thank the President for me, but say that is quite 
                                                                                                     
100 At one point Jones’s code insists on the importance of a lawyer’s loyalty to his client 
in terms that evoke the soldier’s responsibility on the battlefield: “No sacrifice or peril, 
even to loss of life itself, can absolve from the fearless discharge of this duty.” 
ALEXANDER TROY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 248 (1922). 
101 In the South at least, Jones was hardly alone in his martial rhetoric. Addressing the 
Alabama State Bar Association in 1895, Samuel Meek, a Mississippi lawyer and former 
colonel in the Confederate army, declared that  
Yes! The brave lawyer is ever at his post. Morning, noon and night, his 
watchful eye is ever awake, regardful, at all times, of the true interest of his 
fellow man, exposing error and vice, and when necessity demands, striking 
with Herculean power, at the Hidra-headed monster, whose filth and slime and 
unholy touch would paralyze, if not entirely destroy, the holiest instinct of 
individual virtue, as well as the loftiest aims of governmental policy.  
This image of the lawyer in almost literal “St. George and the Dragon” terms is quoted in 
PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX AND THE 
LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 220 (1996).  
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absurd. I know nothing about war. I know nothing about the 
army.” I was told to hold the wire, and in a moment there came 
back the reply, “President McKinley directs me to say that he is 
not looking for any one who knows anything about the army; he 
has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish 
islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.”102 
Even as they began to retreat from the battlefield, however, lawyers in 
general, and corporation lawyers in particular, were unwilling to completely 
disavow support for war-waging. On the eve of World War I, prominent 
corporate attorneys like Root, Grenville Clark, and Paul Cravath promoted 
the cause of “preparedness,” dedicated to priming American manpower for 
the war in Europe. Clark in particular led calls for the creation of so-called 
“businessmen’s camps” that would train potential officers (including 
lawyers) privately, even before war was declared or the government of 
lawyer-president Woodrow Wilson took concrete steps of its own to train an 
expanded army for European deployment.103 
The businessmen’s camps established in Plattsburg, New York, and 
elsewhere turned out to be a success, eventually drawing thousands of 
lawyers, bankers, and other leading citizens into the lower reaches of the 
US Army officer corps.104 This time, however, war would be different, and 
lawyers would take but a secondary role in the strategic leadership of the 
                                                                                                     
102 WARREN ZIMMERMANN, FIRST GREAT TRIUMPH: HOW FIVE AMERICANS MADE 
THEIR COUNTRY A WORLD POWER 147–48 (2004). 
103 On the role of these lawyers in setting up and supporting these camps, see generally J. 
GARRY CLIFFORD, THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS: THE PLATTSBURG TRAINING CAMP 
MOVEMENT, 1913–1920 (1972). For a contemporary account of the camps, see RALPH 
BARTON PERRY, THE PLATTSBURG MOVEMENT: A CHAPTER OF AMERICA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD WAR (1921). 
104 While serving as an officer himself at Camp Funston (Kansas) in 1918, Judge James 
Finley opined that “at least 20 per cent of the junior officers who have been 
commissioned in the Officers’ Reserve and the National Army from the first and second 
Officers’ Training Camps are lawyers by profession.” J. James Finley, Lawyers as 
Warriors, 86 CEN. L.J. 213, 214–15 (1918). 
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American Expeditionary Force.105 Its commander, John Pershing, had a law 
degree he had earned at the University of Nebraska after his West Point 
education (he later claimed that it helped his military career), but his top 
generals and senior officers were virtually all professional military men.106 
The reforms championed by Sherman and Upton and endorsed by the quite 
unmilitary (even if militaristic) Root cast lawyers in World War I in a 
distinctly supporting role. On the field, their occasional leadership was 
marked more by failure than success—one of the biggest US military 
disasters (or near disasters) of the war was the cutting-off and decimation of 
the “Lost Battalion” behind German lines in the Argonne Forest in October 
1918. Although celebrated later as a Dunkirk-esque “victory” with medals 
handed out all ‘round, military professionals at the time were well aware of 
the fact that both the battalion’s two leaders were not regular Army officers, 
but rather Harvard-educated lawyers.107 
Meanwhile, the number of lawyers formally assigned to doing legal work 
in the military grew significantly. Faced with the legal complications of 
having over a million and a half men under arms, many of them far out of 
the reach of US domestic justice, the JAG corps (the origins of which dated 
back to the Revolution) mushroomed from a pre-war level of 17 lawyers to 
over 400.108 Most were deployed in the United States, some were deployed 
                                                                                                     
105 The lawyers who served in World War I seem to have been disproportionately drawn 
from the Northeast, as opposed to the South (Civil War) or the frontier Midwest (1812, 
Mexican War). One is tempted to see here a lingering Southern war-weariness perhaps 
reinforced by a relative lack of Southern or Midwestern economic interest in the conflict. 
Many Northeastern lawyers, especially those from elite law schools and practices, were 
acting consistent with the interest of their corporate clients with significant European 
connections. 
106 The exception was New York attorney and National Guardsman John F. Ryan, who 
commanded the 27th Division through the course of the war. 
107 On the Harvard backgrounds of Charles Whittlesey and George McMurtry, see 
RICHARD SLOTKIN, LOST BATTALIONS: THE GREAT WAR AND THE CRISIS OF 
AMERICAN NATIONALITY 77 (2013). 
108 JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ARMED FORCES, 1775–1980 28 (2001). The Army’s Judge Advocate office had been 
quiescent for several decades in the nineteenth century. Lawyers in the ranks did various 
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to Western Europe, and a few even ended up after the war attached to US 
forces supporting White Russians campaigning against Bolsheviks in 
Siberia. For these men, the military was notably no longer a cause—it was a 
client. 
A variety of factors contributed to the further demilitarization of the bar 
before, during, and after World War I. Urbanization had drawn many 
lawyers from country to city in the decades after 1880. This made economic 
sense as legal business was increasingly concentrated in America’s cities, 
but moving to town removed lawyers from rural environments where they 
had been more familiar with firearms for purposes of work, safety, and 
pastime. Meanwhile the rapid growth and development of military 
technology, which in this period brought the machine gun, the tank, and the 
airplane to the battlefield, meant that even rural lawyers were increasingly 
unfamiliar with the more sophisticated and deadly tools of the military trade 
(interestingly, a disproportionate number of high-end corporate lawyers in 
World War I appear to have joined the new Army Air Service, partly 
because they were among the few Americans who were wealthy enough to 
have had any peacetime familiarity with flying machines).109 
                                                                                                     
sorts of official and unofficial legal work as required by circumstance, but between 1821 
and 1849, the Army actually had no official Judge Advocate. WITT, supra note 80, at 
264. 
109 One of the best examples of this group is Raynal Bolling, a Harvard Law School 
graduate and former colleague of Paul Cravath’s who rose to be general counsel of US 
Steel in 1913. In 1915, Bolling began to take flying lessons in the New York area with a 
group of businessmen; he later formed an aviation group within the National Guard. 
Picked to be chief of air service for the US II Corps in France, he was killed on the 
ground in March 1918 when his staff car was ambushed by oncoming German forces. For 
more on Bolling’s legal career and death, see Bolling Won Fame as a Young Lawyer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1918; Carl White, Colonel Raynal C. Bollwing, HISTORICALLY 
SPEAKING, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.greenwichlibrary.org/blog/historically_speaking/ 
2011/11/colonel-raynal-c-bolling.html. Corporate lawyers may also have been drawn to 
flying because airplanes were new high-tech machines; in the early decades of the 
twentieth century—the “machine age,” as it was dubbed by contemporaries—association 
with and mastery of flying machines conferred additional social status. My thanks for this 
suggestion go to Ron Schuler, currently completing a history of Allegheny County 
(Pennsylvania) lawyers tentatively entitled The Steel Bar. 
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In addition, the American legal profession itself had changed. Long gone 
from the American legal mind were the Roman role models whose 
martiality had helped inspire the Revolutionary generation, and who had 
still been held up as examples for college educated law students at least 
down to the 1870s; the demise of the classical educational curriculum and 
the broadening of the American bar’s demographic base had seen to that. At 
the same time, the movement of lawyers from courtroom to boardroom 
accelerated in the early twentieth century, finding direct military expression 
in the shift of World War I lawyers from the front line to the back office. 
Transactional lawyers lost not only the opportunity but also much of the 
legal skill set and community standing that had previously allowed lawyers 
to be military leaders. Corporate “Wall Street” attorneys like Root, Clark, 
and Cravath still had the power and political influence to push others to 
war, but it is at least questionable whether they had the rhetorical skill and 
public presence required to successfully lead men into battle; the very 
suggestion strikes one today as vaguely pathetic, and even comical. 
Of course they themselves had no interest in the option. They were 
satisfied with professional careers that gave them increasing personal 
wealth and status within their own specialized elite group. Legal practice 
was becoming more complex and challenging every year, with new forms 
of business organization and reorganization and a seemingly never-ending 
avalanche of case reports and treatises to master. Newly gathered in “big 
firms” (defined for a while as four or more lawyers, then ten or more 
lawyers), successful corporate attorneys moreover found that they now 
lacked the organizational flexibility to be American minutemen that their 
counterparts in solo practices or small two-partner offices had enjoyed 
decades before. To the extent that these lawyers had public service 
aspirations, those could be conveniently satisfied in other ways. In 
particular, the rise of legal aid societies provided a more professionally 
useful and socially acceptable form of demonstrative “public virtue.” Legal 
aid itself was never entirely disconnected from public order—exponents 
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like Arthur von Briesen openly discussed it as a way to keep less favored 
elements in American society satisfied and in their place,110 but at least it 
did not require its devotees to take up arms or expose themselves to 
personal danger. 
Finally, the very personnel of American law were changing. Women 
were now entering legal practice in significant if still small numbers. 
American society in the early twentieth century was unwilling to let them 
vote, let alone send them off to war, and women lawyers themselves 
showed no interest in personal militarization. On the contrary, a number of 
women lawyers departed from professional tradition in coming out publicly 
for peace, anti-militarism, and even pacifism. These causes had notably 
lacked prominent male champions in the nineteenth century American bar, 
perhaps with the exception of radical abolitionists like William Jay (son of 
John) and Charles Sumner (at least prior to the Civil War). In this context, 
the strong anti-militarist stance of someone like Crystal Eastman stood 
out.111 A bar that included her and others of her sex was less and less a bar 
that was willing to drop its practices and march off to war. 
World War II demonstrated the extent of the change that had occurred in 
lawyers’ context and military posture. As in World War I, thousands of 
                                                                                                     
110 He explained: 
It keeps the poor satisfied, because it establishes and protects their rights; it 
produces better workingmen and better workingwomen, better house servants; it 
antagonizes the tendency toward communism; it is the best argument against the 
socialist who cries that the poor have no rights which the rich are bound to 
respect. 
Quoted in CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 59 (1998).  
111 A 1907 graduate of New York University Law School, Eastman initially made her 
mark by investigating working conditions of industrial laborers in the Pittsburgh area and 
helping to frame early workers’ compensation laws in New York. During World War I, 
she was executive director of the American Union Against Militarism and later joined 
Roger Baldwin and others in the National Civil Liberties Bureau, which later became the 
ACLU. On Eastman’s remarkable life and controversial legal career, see JOHN FABIAN 
WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW, 157–
208 (2009). 
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lawyers enlisted or were drafted into service (some 20,000 by war’s end),112 
but with an improved selective service system focused on younger draftees, 
the proportion of lawyer-recruits appears to have been much lower than in 
previous conflicts, and even fewer lawyers than before saw significant 
combat. Only one lawyer, National Guard Major General Leonard Wing, 
seems to have risen to the rank of commander of a combat division.113 
Lawyers were shifted in other directions, including the JAG Corps (which 
rose to a remarkable strength of almost 3,000 in 1945)114 and increasingly, 
foreign and military intelligence, where Wall Street lawyers like “Wild 
Bill” Donovan set up the Office of Strategic Services.115 In the Cold War, of 
course, that became the CIA. 
There would of course be other American wars in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, but after World War II, the modern pattern of 
military lawyering had been established. The role of lawyers in the 
American military would not be to fight, but to advise, to control, and to 
judge. It was a role that post-World War II American lawyers felt so 
                                                                                                     
112 Royall, supra note 70. 
113 On Wing’s career as a “lawyer turned general”, see  Lawyers in War: The VBA and 
World War II, 21-AUG VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 9 (1995); In the Fall of 1945, Maj. Gen. 
Leonard Wing Came Marching Home,  RUTLAND HERALD, Nov. 24, 2005, http://www. 
rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051124/NEWS/511240320/1014.  
114 Royall, supra note 70.  
115 On Donovan and his associates, see BURTON HERSH, THE OLD BOYS: THE AMERICAN 
ELITE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CIA 30–52 (1992). The general lawyerly shift to 
intelligence work may actually have started during and after World War I. Major Ralph 
Van Deman, the “father of military intelligence” in these years, had attended Harvard 
Law School briefly in the early 1890s before going to medical school. From the 1920s 
on, lawyer J. Edgar Hoover (a devotee of Van Deman and his methods) aggressively 
recruited Catholic lawyers for domestic intelligence work with the still-relatively new 
FBI. See generally STEVE ROSSWURM, THE FBI AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 1935–
1962 (2010). The connection between lawyering and the US intelligence services raises 
the larger question of American lawyers’ connection with the general domestic police 
forces that arose in many cities from the late nineteenth century on, and whether some 
unreconstructed “martial lawyers” moved into senior positions there in the twentieth 
century as regular or Guard military service became less attractive or even possible. 
There is some incidental evidence of this, but for the moment it remains outside the scope 
of this paper. 
448 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE 
comfortable with—and, in a world of nuclear weapons, perhaps so relieved 
about—that they (and we) conveniently forgot that it had ever been any 
other way. And this forgetfulness became even more all-encompassing as 
fewer and fewer lawyers over time had any contact with the military at all, 
becoming for the most part not just non-combatants, but incorrigible 
civilians. In the wake of “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” in the 1990s, military 
recruiters actually became persona non grata on most law school 
campuses.116 Even in this environment, American lawyers never entirely 
lost their connection with war-waging (the current Commander-in-Chief—
the man who ultimately authorizes drone strikes and figuratively keeps his 
finger on the nuclear button—is notably a lawyer), but apart from a perverse 
spike in their usage of martial metaphors for lawyering117 they rarely 
thought about or even acknowledged the larger link. 
III. MARTIAL LAWYERING: TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 
At the end of this article, I would like to ask two important and 
complementary questions. First, how did war-waging shape American 
lawyers, and second, how did American lawyers shape war-waging? My 
answers to both these queries are at this stage somewhat vague and 
speculative; I offer them here not as definitive responses, but as invitations 
to further thought and research. 
War-waging arguably shaped American lawyers in a variety of ways, 
some perhaps obvious, and some not. First—most prosaically but in some 
sense most fundamentally—war shaped lawyers’ individual lives, careers, 
                                                                                                     
116 On the roots, extent and implications of the recent disconnect between lawyers and the 
military, see Dennis G. Jacobs, Lawyers at War, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2011).   
117 Again, the relationship between legal language and personal military experience seems 
to be inverse. See generally supra note 93. On the multiplication of martial metaphors in 
contemporary American legal discourse, especially from the 1980s onward, see generally 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape 
the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995); ROBERT TSAI, AM. U. –WASH. 
C. L., THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457973. 
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hearts, and minds. It was the making of some; it literally killed others. 
Emotionally, it inevitably drew many lawyers towards a level of devotion to 
cause and country that we can scarcely imagine today,118 and it may help to 
explain some of the fervent devotion to “the Union” and “the Republic” 
reflected in early-to-mid-nineteenth century legal orations. One would think 
this would have substantially affected martial lawyers’ views of law itself, 
perhaps helping to elevate its perceived moral sense or making it in their 
eyes more compatible with (at least their vision of) the community good, as 
opposed to some set of abstract positivistic rules. In this context, one is 
tempted to juxtapose the vigorous natural law jurisprudence of 
Revolutionary War veteran John Marshall119 with the cramped case-based 
approach of the bookish and extremely unmilitary Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, who, despite being of plausible enlistment age, managed to ignore 
the entire Civil War while squirreled away in his pre-Harvard New York 
law office.120 By the same token, the personal experience of war must have 
                                                                                                     
118 John Marshall later wrote that his military service made him a nationalist: “I was 
confirmed in the habit of considering America as my country and Congress as my 
government.” JOHN MARSHALL’S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL LETTER, available at http://frien 
dsofthehollow.org/letter.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). Marshall wrote the letter to 
fellow Supreme Court justice Joseph Story at the latter’s request in 1827. In this context 
one wonders in passing whether the precipitous decline in lawyers’ military service in the 
decades since World War II (and especially after 1975 once veterans of that war began 
retiring from the profession in significant numbers) has helped to draw them away from 
championing federal power. 
119 Marshall fought in some of the bloodiest battles of the Revolution, including 
Brandywine and Germantown. JOHN MARSHALL’S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL LETTER, supra 
note 118. On Marshall’s military experiences and their direct impact on his constitutional 
thought, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 21–27 (2001). 
120 Langdell was 35 in 1861; the upper cut-off for enlistment in the Civil War was 45. 
Langdell’s notoriously poor eyesight from childhood on would probably have 
compromised or disqualified him even if he had been inclined to join up, however. On 
Langdell’s already poor eyesight during his student days at Harvard Law School in the 
1850s, see BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906 35 (2009). 
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taken its psychological toll on some—perhaps many—lawyers.121 We know 
that it undermined the youthful idealism of Civil War veteran Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.,122 and by doing so laid the groundwork for later legal 
realism; it might be worthwhile in the future to track other lawyers’ legal-
philosophical arcs against their wartime experiences. Again as an aside, one 
wonders whether the sweeping positivism of post-Civil War American law 
to some extent reflected battle-weary lawyers’ despair about even the 
possibility of a grander law based on timeless truths. 
Second, war-waging actively encouraged American lawyers to seek and 
embrace public leadership and gave them public standing. It gave them a 
very obvious and potentially quite vulnerable public role as community 
leaders in the most extreme of circumstances that challenged them to 
perform or risk losing honor and reputation. In the process—especially in 
the confines of the militia and the National Guard—it forced them to pay 
close attention to local affairs and constituencies. If they did their duty well, 
they stood to be rewarded by enhanced social connections and political 
office. If they performed poorly, they stood to be shamed and disavowed in 
subtle and not-so-subtle ways that could even compromise their future 
professional success. 
Third, war-waging implicitly and explicitly encouraged lawyers to build 
connections, with both other lawyers and non-lawyers. Most obviously, in 
the close confines of combat, lawyer-soldiers developed a habit of co-
operating with (or deferring to) their professional peers more than they 
might have with each other in peacetime, especially when most lawyers 
tended to work alone or in very small firms. In this context, it is probably no 
                                                                                                     
121 The psychological impact of the Civil War on its veterans—disorders that we would 
now classify as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other related types of conflict-
generated anxiety and depression—has been woefully understudied, especially given the 
mass number of these veterans and their prominent roles in post-war American life. For a 
beginning, see DAVID SILKENAT, MOMENTS OF DESPAIR: SUICIDE, DIVORCE AND DEBT 
IN CIVIL WAR ERA NORTH CAROLINA 23–51 (2011). 
122 See generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK 
AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000). 
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accident that the greatest periods of lawyer integration in bar associations 
came in the wake of the Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, and World 
War II, each of which provided lawyers in command and even in the ranks 
with models of large-scale organizational integration. Certainly the 
precipitous decline of military service of any sort for lawyers in the post-
Vietnam era corresponded not only with a decline in the strength and 
cohesion of American bar associations, but also with the loss of 
professional or firm-based “esprit de corps” in favor of personal career 
agendas that encouraged individual attorneys (particularly so-called 
“rainmakers”) to put their interests above those of their colleagues, up to 
and beyond the point of routinely abandoning their firms and their fellow 
partners for greener financial pastures. Even apart from this, however, 
military service brought lawyers into close and intimate contact with 
members of other social and occupational groups—businessmen, farmers, 
physicians, teachers, laborers, and so on—and did so outside the latters’ 
potential capacity as clients. In this environment, lawyers arguably became 
more familiar with other groups and more accustomed to working with 
them cooperatively, rather than in a strict business hierarchy. Military 
service subtly encouraged lawyers to remain connected to their 
communities even as they became more willing to organize their own 
professional associations. When lawyers no longer engaged in meaningful 
military service (and/or were largely limited to working with other lawyers 
in JAG environments), this sense of connection weakened, and it became 
easier for lawyers to regard other occupations adversely or pejoratively (and 
vice versa). 
Fourth, war-waging sustained American lawyers by giving them 
economic support and benefits. In periods such as the early-to-mid 
nineteenth century when the supply of lawyers exceeded demand, especially 
in the Midwest, war-waging offered opportunities that allowed impecunious 
lawyers with little or no “social net” to survive and prosper. Some lawyers 
went to war for pay, some went to war for land. War, moreover, provided 
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an outwardly-directed “safety valve” for American society that focused 
these potentially dangerous lawyers (dangerous as much for their capacity 
to rally others as for their military skill) outward rather than inward—in 
times of personal and professional stress, they repeatedly chose (and had the 
opportunity) to become mercenaries rather than revolutionaries. If displaced 
and discontented lawyers like Sam Houston, Daniel Cloud, William 
Walker, and others had had nowhere to go in a closed America, what other 
politically-problematic causes—and what other forms of violence—might 
they have embraced in their fervor for fame and fortune? 
Fifth, American lawyers’ strong historical connection with—indeed, their 
affection for—war-waging arguably inhibited them from promoting peace 
as a core professional value. Writing in 1814, for example, prominent 
Virginia lawyer-soldiers William Wirt, St. George Tucker, and Dabney 
Carr123 were clearly of the opinion that war elevated and inspired the spirit 
of a people, while peace diminished and distracted them. “[I]t seems as if it 
were only amid the direful calamities of war that man can be seen to 
advantage[,]” they wrote, “as if all the trumpet’s clangor and the cannon’s 
roar were necessary, to keep his virtues and talents awake.”124 Times, 
however, had changed. “That spirit of public virtue, of love of country, 
which extinguished every private feeling and glowed with such attractive 
lustre during the revolution is fled,” they pessimistically observed.125  
We are all in pursuit of wealth, of places, of offices, of salaries, of 
honors—instead of being, as we were, during the last war, 
forgetful of ourselves, and looking around only for those who 
could do the most good to our common country. . . . [T]ogether 
                                                                                                     
123 It will be recalled that Wirt had enthusiastically volunteered to form a “Legion” of 
four regiments during the war fever that broke out in Virginia and other parts of the 
United States after the Chesapeake–Leopard impressment incident of 1807; St. George 
Tucker had fought in the Revolutionary War; Carr also saw militia service.  
124 WILLIAM WIRT, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, DABNEY CARR, THE OLD BACHELOR 33 
(1814). 
125 Id. at 35. 
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with public spirit, peace has extinguished the capacity for public 
service.126 
Perhaps not surprisingly in this context of such musings, the leaders of 
the peace movement in antebellum America were ministers, religiously-
oriented laymen, or abolitionists, not lawyers.127 Only in the late nineteenth 
century when women started to enter the profession and labor-oriented 
lawyers who had witnessed strikes put down by force began to turn against 
the Army and the National Guard did a significant number of lawyers 
embrace pacifist or overtly anti-militarist causes. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, however, the affiliation of American lawyers with 
national and international peace grew as they became personally dissociated 
from war-waging and personally disconnected from the military altogether. 
Growing awareness of the horrors of modern warfare certainly facilitated 
                                                                                                     
126 Id. In 1810, directly pressing for war with Britain, Midwestern lawyer-politician 
Henry Clay made a similar point:  
Another effect of war will be the reproduction and cherishing of a martial spirit 
among us. Is there not danger that we shall become enervated by the spirit of 
avarice unfortunately so predominant? . . . [A] certain portion of military ardor 
. . . is essential to the protection of the country. The withered arm and wrinkled 
brow of the illustrious founders of our freedom are melancholy indications that 
they will shortly be removed from us. Their deeds of glory and renown will 
then be felt only through the cold medium of the historic page. We shall want 
the presence and living example of a new race of heroes to supply their place, 
and to animate us to preserve unviolated what they achieved.  
Henry Clay, Speech on the Proposed Repeal of the Non-Intercourse Act (Feb. 22, 1810), 
in PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 449 (John F. Hopkins ed., 1959). 
127 On the peace movement and its leadership before the Civil War, see generally 
VALARIE H. ZIEGLER, THE ADVOCATES OF PEACE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (1992). 
Prior to the antebellum period, American pacifism was primarily confined to Quakers. 
Three prominent legal figures who spoke out powerfully for peace and against war prior 
to 1861—abolitionists Judge William Jay (son of John), Charles Sumner, and Simon 
Greenleaf (an evangelical)—were exceptional. All drew criticism and even derision 
within the American legal community for the positions they took. Taking direct issue 
with Sumner, his former student at Harvard Law School, Justice Joseph Story insisted 
that “war is under some (although I agree not many) circumstances, not only justifiable, 
but an indispensable part of public duty.” DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER 
AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 95 (2009). Greenleaf died in 1853, followed by Jay 
in 1858; Sumner lived into the Civil War years and ultimately supported the North’s 
military effort, but reverted to more pacifistic rhetoric again afterwards. 
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this professional change of heart, but it seems highly unlikely that (for 
example) the 1950s slogan of “world peace through world law”128 would 
have been championed by lawyers who had led men into battle. Indeed, it 
never was. 
Now we come to the second and perhaps even more difficult question: 
How did lawyers shape American war-waging? Here, I think the impact of 
lawyers changed significantly over time. Initially, lawyers limited American 
war-waging by consciously de-professionalizing the American military. In 
the Constitutional period, many lawyers’ suspicion of “standing armies” 
and their taking of military duties upon themselves helped to ensure that the 
incipient US military did not develop a class of highly-trained professional 
officers who could challenge lawyers for control of the state or readily 
utilize war as an efficient weapon (potentially against the populace and/or 
against its legal leadership as much as against an external enemy). On the 
battlefield, lawyers further limited American war-waging capacity by their 
own tactical failures and shortcomings. At a minimum, their restricted 
military abilities repeatedly compromised American land strategies in the 
War of 1812 and likely lengthened (and made more bloody) the Civil War. 
At the same time, American lawyers legalized the war-waging process. In 
many respects, they shifted the focus of war-waging from fighting to 
organizing, developing a penchant for achieving legally-defined goals 
through legally-defined instruments and mechanisms. In their hands, 
command itself became an expression of law set down in rules even if, 
given the number of lawyers in regular military positions, the army did not 
at first require a heavily staffed legal administration to enforce those 
rules.129 
                                                                                                     
128 Most famously echoed as a title in LOUIS B. SOHN & GRENVILLE CLARK, WORLD 
PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (1958). The book advocated revisions to the UN Charter.  
129  See WITT, supra note 80, at 264 (noting the absence of an Army Judge Advocate 
between 1821 and 1849). The Army only began to “lawyer up” in the Civil War, when 
new Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt recruited some 33 lawyers (mostly from the 
“northern antislavery elite”) to assist him. Id. 
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The legalization of American war was very much evident in the career of 
lawyer-general Winfield Scott. In 1821, Scott completed work on his 
General Regulations for the Army, which one of his biographers has called 
the army’s “first, comprehensive, systematic set of military by-laws” 
covering army administration, instruction, service and police.130 In 1835, he 
revised the army’s tactical manual (and, like a good lawyer, later 
copyrighted it!).131 He also exercised lawyerly persuasive and diplomatic 
skills to great advantage. To quote his biographer again: 
 On several occasions from 1838 to 1841 Scott helped prevent an 
Anglo-American war. Through skillful diplomacy, artful oratory 
and improvisation he defused numerous potential crises; and more 
important, he bought time for the two countries to begin talks that 
would settle most of the underlying problems. The Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842 resulted from these negotiations.132  
Here was a lawyer at work. In the Mexican War, Scott drafted an 
innovative martial law order that applied prohibitions against rape, murder, 
assault, desecration, and destruction of property to Mexican citizens as well 
as American soldiers, and that put members of both groups under the 
jurisdiction of American military courts. His post-war administration of 
occupied Mexico was so effective that at one point, a Mexican delegation 
offered to make him interim president if he would prepare the country for 
annexation to the United States (Scott, being against annexation, 
declined).133 Scott’s wide-ranging personal abilities—especially those 
informed by his legal training and inclinations—proved particularly helpful 
in circumstances where senior commanders were not yet connected with 
                                                                                                     
130 TIMOTHY J. JOHNSON, WINFIELD SCOTT: THE QUEST FOR MILITARY GLORY 76 
(1998). 
131 See WINFIELD SCOTT, INFANTRY TACTICS; OR, RULES FOR THE EXERCISE AND 
MANOEUVRES OF THE UNITED STATES’ INFANTRY 4 (1840). 
132 JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 135. 
133 Id. at 209.  
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legal or other advisors in Washington by omnipresent telegraph or 
telephone lines, or even (in Scott’s case) railroads. 
The ultimate legalization of American war was achieved in 1863 when 
the military, prompted by lawyer-commander Henry Halleck, adopted the 
Lieber Code on the laws of war.134 Ironically, this was lawyers’ “parting 
gift” to the military, a comprehensive attempt to both legally sanctify and 
constrain war that was made at precisely the time when lawyers, 
symbolically led by Halleck himself, were beginning to abandon the field. 
Why did lawyers show so little interest in developing specific legal rules for 
war-waging while they themselves were in charge? I do not have a good 
answer for that question at this point. Military evidence does not suggest 
that lawyer-led combat prior to 1863 was particularly gentle, gentlemanly, 
or self-policing, although the general scope of conventional war-waging 
prior to the Civil War was more limited than it was afterwards.135 Maybe 
common-law trained lawyers felt there was no need to codify military legal 
practice across the board, and were happy to let it evolve on a case-by-case 
basis, incidentally leaving them with more individual discretion on and off 
the field. Only after codification became a trend in jurisdictions like New 
York and California (and Halleck was a California lawyer) did lawyers in 
the military embrace it. 
Finally, however, lawyers gave back to the military as much as they at 
first took away. From the 1870s on, lawyers contributed to the 
professionalization of the American military indirectly by withdrawing to 
their own surging profession and directly by encouraging military 
professionalization initiatives (Sherman) and supporting the development of 
military organizational infrastructures (Root) that would support improved 
                                                                                                     
134 Despite the subsequent eponymous identification of the code with Lieber, Halleck’s 
own contribution to the work as both muse and editor should not be underestimated. In 
1861, the accomplished Halleck had published a book of his own entitled “International 
law, or, Rules regulating the intercourse of states in peace and war.” 
135 See generally WITT, supra note 80. 
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war-waging. If nothing else, they left the military—and American war-
waging capacity—much stronger than they found it. 
All this suggests that in a larger sense, at the end of the day, American 
lawyers made a double Faustian bargain. In the first place, their retreat from 
the field helped them concentrate their professional efforts so as to reach 
unprecedented economic heights, but in the process they surrendered a 
critical connection to their communities. They withdrew from a very public 
form of leadership and association into professional-organizational cocoons 
that largely cloistered them with each other and with other corporate and 
financial managers. This helped undermine their public spiritedness and 
their inclination to public service (however much self-promoting) at the 
same time as it reduced their public status by eliminating much of their 
perceived personal commitment to their country’s success when the stakes 
were highest. Martial lawyers may never have been American paragons, but 
by risking their lives and reputations, they contributed to the social strength 
and standing of the legal profession as much as if not more than they 
contributed to the defense of the nation. 
In the second place, returning to the theme with which I began this 
article, the demise of martial lawyers may have made it possible for 
members of the American legal community to craft and cultivate a new 
collective identity for themselves as peacemakers, but they only 
accomplished this by letting the American military genie out of the political 
and constitutional bottle in which lawyers had originally confined it. They 
gave themselves the moral and pacifistic high ground by handing their 
military leadership roles to specialized military professionals who made 
American war-waging much more efficient, more violent, more 
geographically wide-ranging, and more common than it had ever been. And 
it was not as if they simply looked the other way while all this was 
happening—in the War Department and elsewhere in the American military 
bureaucracy, lawyers like Elihu Root overtly directed and facilitated those 
developments even after they had rejected any thought of personal military 
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service. As a result, the self-congratulatory “pacifization” of the American 
legal profession both domestically and on the world stage (the latter paraded 
most publicly in Root’s own pre-World War I campaign for international 
arbitration as a war substitute, a campaign that won him the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1912) was purchased at the price of a radical American 
militarization that was only very marginally constrained by the proliferation 
of JAGs. Perhaps it is time for contemporary lawyers tempted to trumpet 
their dedication to peace and self-righteously decry the brutal excesses of 
the “warfare state” to take a good long look in the historical mirror and 
consider what they themselves have wrought. 
 
